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COERCING PREGNANCY
A. RACHEL CAMP*
ABSTRACT
Intimate partners coerce thousands of women in the United
States into pregnancy each year through manipulation, threats of vio-
lence, or acts that deliberately interfere with the use of, or access to,
contraception or abortion. Although many of these pregnancies
occur within the context of otherwise abusive relationships, for others,
pregnancy serves as a trigger for intimate partner violence. Beyond
violence preceding or resulting from pregnancy, women who experi-
ence coerced pregnancies often suffer other physical, financial and
emotional harms. Despite its correlation to domestic violence, repro-
ductive coercion fits imperfectly, if at all, within our existing laws
designed to combat domestic violence or rape. Although the harms
of forced sex and, though to a slightly lesser extent, the harms of
domestic violence, are well understood and accepted in our culture
and our laws, the harm of experiencing a pregnancy through coercive
acts remains largely invisible in both spheres, despite the prevalence
of coerced pregnancies. This Article begins by filling in the missing
narrative of reproductive coercion by exploring the social and legal
contours of how women are coerced into pregnancy, the harms that
can result, and the deep correlation between such acts and domestic
violence. It then explores how our cultural and legal conflation of
pregnancy with sex, motherhood and even abortion, limits our ability
to isolate and understand the experience of pregnancy coercion. This
Article concludes by considering how arming feminists and other
advocates with an increased understanding of the interrelatedness
between pregnancy, coercion, and intimate partner abuse can help
to broaden domestic violence laws and policies, and reconceptualize
pregnancy prevention as violence prevention.
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INTRODUCTION
Woman must have her freedom—the funda-
mental freedom of choosing whether or not she
shall be a mother and how many children she will
have. Regardless of what man’s attitude may be,
that problem is hers—and before it can be his, it is
hers alone.
She goes through the vale of death alone, each
time a babe is born. As it is the right neither of man
nor the state to coerce her into this ordeal, so it is
her right to decide whether she will endure it.1
Jessica became pregnant less than four months into dating her
boyfriend.2 As she described it, “he refused to give me funds to pur-
chase birth control, and always refused to use condoms after we be-
came exclusive.” 3 Jessica and her boyfriend lived in a community
1. MARGARET SANGER, WOMAN AND THE NEW RACE 100 (1920).
2. “Jessica’s” Story, KNOWMORE (2008), archived at http://perma.cc/E5CD-S92P.
3. Id.
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where “Planned Parenthood is maligned and access to low cost birth
control is made extremely difficult by opponents.” 4 As such, she had
limited options for pregnancy prevention. When Jessica and her boy-
friend “decided to continue the pregnancy and marry, the overt abuse
started within days of [their] wedding.” 5 According to Jessica, her
husband was “verbally, emotionally, financially, sexually, and phys-
ically abusive to me . . . He would always refuse my attempts at
birth control.” 6 
Increasingly women share stories similar to Jessica’s. Male part-
ners deliberately interfere with their use of contraception, its effective-
ness, or with their ability to obtain an abortion through assaults,
manipulation, threats of physical harm, or direct sabotage of birth
control.7 These acts of coercion are designed to exert or maintain
control over a woman by imposing a pregnancy on her.8 Though the
existing cultural narrative of pregnancy coercion is one dominated
by stories of women deceptively tricking their male partners into
pregnancy,9 social science research and these increasingly shared
experiences of women and girls are turning “on its head the notion
that it’s always women who are trying to trick their boyfriends into
getting them pregnant.”10
Although stories like Jessica’s are being increasingly told, the
experiences of women coerced into pregnancy—including the abuse
that both precedes and follows—remain largely invisible. Our culture
and our laws assume that if a woman engages in consensual sex and
becomes pregnant,11 that pregnancy also was her choice; consent for
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also “Janey’s” Story, KNOWMORE (2008), archived at http://perma.cc/7EY6
-L2J2; “Erika’s” Story, KNOWMORE (2008), archived at http://perma.cc/H3LR-C88W.
8. See “Jessica’s” Story, supra note 2.
9. See Conversation: Lynn Harris & Elizabeth Miller on Reproductive Coercion, THE
NATION ON GRIT TV (July 28, 2010), http://www.thenation.com/video/37984/conversation
-lynn-harris-elizabeth-miller-reproductive-coercion#, archived at http://perma.cc/L8BW
-7ZP3.
10. Id.
11. When sex is (and whether it can be) fully “consensual” is an issue that has been
explored by feminist scholars for decades. See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 142–43
(1987) (arguing that heterosexual sex is coercive); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172–73 (1989) (asserting that it is “difficult to distin-
guish” rape from “consensual” intercourse given the cultural context of male dominance);
see also Meredith J. Duncan, Sex Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line
Between Forcible Rape and Nonconsensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1113–15
(2007); Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171,
201 (2013); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 172 (2000) (each arguing that
the lines between rape and sexual acts that are not legally rape but also are not consen-
sual are unclear, at best). Although these discussions are critical to understanding women’s
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sex assumes consent for pregnancy. When an unwanted or unintended
pregnancy occurs, the dominant cultural narrative is one that vacil-
lates between punishment or blessing with little space in between
for wondering about the experience of the pregnant woman. That is,
even when unintended, pregnancy often is viewed as an appropriate
“consequence” for engaging in sex in the first place—a socio-legal
reprimand of “you’ve made your bed, now lie in it,”12 or the positive
constructions of motherhood and anticipated joys of a resulting child
offset any “harm” an unintended pregnancy may impose. For women
already marginalized in our culture—young, poor, unmarried, or of
color—the pregnancy is often identified as a punishing consequence
for perceived promiscuity and irresponsibility. A nuanced considera-
tion of the conditions within which the pregnancy occurred or whether
the pregnancy was consensual is absent.
In part, this lack of nuance comes from the ways that our culture
and our legal system shields privacy and autonomy relating to sex
and contraception with impenetrable privacy, unless in the most
egregious of circumstances.13 Though feminist advocates have made
significant progress over the past forty years advancing laws that
protect women and girls from forced sex, little has been done to protect
them from forced or coerced pregnancies. To move coerced pregnancies
into a space of cultural and legal legitimacy requires a shift in our
view of pregnancy itself. While there may be an intuitive cultural
understanding that a pregnancy resulting from coercion may be harm-
ful to a woman, to name pregnancy as something that may impose
harm in the same way that other forms of domestic or sexual vio-
lence may impose harm, requires challenging the normative, positive
sexual experiences, for purposes of this Article, consensual intercourse is assumed to be
that which is not legally rape—that is, sex that is not compelled by force or direct threat
of bodily injury. See Marie K. Pesando, Definitions and general considerations, 65 AM.
JUR. 2D Rape § 1 (2011); see also Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy is an Injury: Rape,
Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457, 466 (2013) (identifying that most jurisdictions
define rape as including “some mixture of the elements of sexual intercourse, victim
nonconsent, and use of force by the perpetrator”).
12. Although this Article explores the harms that come to women from a coerced and,
therefore, unintended pregnancy, those harms are not finite. If a child results from the
pregnancy, a woman experience harms that differ from, or add to, the harms identified in
this Article. Consideration of those harms, although critical to understanding the experi-
ences of women coerced into pregnancy, is beyond the scope of this Article.
13. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (holding “liberty protects the per-
son from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places”);
see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern. Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (holding “intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime . . . are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that a fundamental right to privacy is the decision to
use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (same).
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cultural construction of pregnancy and motherhood—constructions
that provide little flexibility. Though the experience of pregnancy
mirrors the current cultural narrative for many women—an expe-
rience invited, a time of happiness, willing sacrifice, and excitement
about pending motherhood14—for those who experience pregnancy
through deliberate interference with the use of, or access to, con-
traception, it can result in deep infringement on their reproductive
liberty, autonomy, sense of self, and result in physical, financial, and
emotional harm.15 Similar to other forms of domestic violence, preg-
nancy can be a tool that limits a woman’s independence and move-
ment, and pregnancy can force dependence on an intimate partner.16
Acts of pregnancy coercion frequently occur within a broader context
of an abusive relationship,17 with violence either preceding the
coercion, or beginning during a pregnancy. In any other context, the
imposition of a harm upon another could likely result in civil or
criminal liability.18 In the context of imposing a pregnancy, outside of
exceedingly limited circumstances, it does not.19
This Article explores the social phenomenon of pregnancy, acts
that coerce it, and the contexts within which coerced pregnancies
occur. Part I defines methods used to coerce pregnancy and explores
the correlation between pregnancy coercion and intimate partner
abuse. Part II identifies the specific harms that befall women who ex-
perience a coerced pregnancy, including the correlation between unin-
tended pregnancy, intimate partner violence, and homicide. Part III
explores how our current legal and cultural narratives on sex,
motherhood, and even abortion, limit the cultural and legal urgency
to name and respond to acts that coerce pregnancy. Finally, Part IV
considers how an increased understanding of the interrelatedness
between pregnancy, coercion, and intimate partner abuse can be used
within our legal and advocacy systems to more fully understand the
experiences of pregnant women, and how that understanding can be
used to advocate for laws and policies that conceptualize pregnancy
prevention as violence prevention.20
14. See Bridges, supra note 11, at 461.
15. Id. at 496.
16. Shane M. Trawick, Comment, Birth Control Sabotage as Domestic Violence: A
Legal Response, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 733–34 (2012).
17. See infra Part I for further discussion.
18. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 746.
19. Id. at 735–36.
20. This Article explores the role that intimate partners play in coercing pregnancy, and
how our culture and laws respond to those private acts. To understand the experiences of
pregnant women, however, it also is critical to understand the State’s role in creating
barriers for women to respond to or avoid a coerced pregnancy. Part IV of this Article
briefly discusses the State’s role; a separate article will also explore this topic further.
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I. PREGNANCY COERCION DEFINED
Giving context to the experiences of women who are coerced into
pregnancy and the relationships in which such coercion often exists
is critical to understanding women’s experiences and our socio-legal
response. This section begins by exploring the methods men use to
coerce pregnancy. It then explores the relational context, often charac-
terized by intimate partner abuse, within which these methods com-
monly are used.
A. Methods Used to Coerce Pregnancy
Reproductive coercion broadly is the “deliberate restriction of op-
tions” 21 intended to control and regulate autonomous and informed
decision-making regarding whether and when to become pregnant,
or whether to maintain or terminate an existing pregnancy. Preg-
nancy coercion is a form of reproductive coercion where the intent
is to impose a pregnancy upon a woman.22 Almost one in ten women
report that an intimate partner has tried to get her pregnant when
she did not want to be, or has had a partner who refused to wear a
condom during intercourse.23 Women also report having partners
who refuse to allow them to access abortions by withholding money
or transportation, or by threatening to leave a relationship or phys-
ically harm her if she terminates her pregnancy.24
The methods used by men attempting to coerce a woman into
pregnancy can be categorized—albeit imperfectly—by the degree to
which they interfere with her physical autonomy. Acts of physical and
sexual violence used to coerce pregnancy result in the most direct
21. Janet Radcliffe Richards, Consent with Inducements: The Case of Body Parts and
Services, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 281, 292 (Franklin G. Miller
& Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
22. Other forms of reproductive coercion include acts that coerce a woman into termi-
nating a pregnancy, or that harm her with the intent to cause a miscarriage. See infra
Part IV; see also LINDA CHAMBERLAIN & REBECCA LEVENSON, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVEN-
TION FUND, AN INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND REPRO-
DUCTIVE COERCION 6 (2010), available at http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles
/file/HealthCare/Repro_Guide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E8BB-8TED.
23. See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 48 (2010).
24. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 730–34 (2012); Barbara Stark, The Women’s Con-
vention, Reproductive Rights, and the Reproduction of Gender, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 261, 279–80 (2011). Sociologist Evan Stark recounts abortion coercion through a
story of one of his former clients whose medical records revealed that she had undergone
an abortion “at her husband’s insistence and against her wishes and religious scruples.”
EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 292 (2007)
[hereinafter STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL].
2015] COERCING PREGNANCY 281
interference with a woman’s physical autonomy. Sexual violence, in-
cluding rape and incest, is most commonly identified as a way to exert
control over another through forced sex.25 Sexual violence may also
be used to force a pregnancy upon a woman.26 Although the specific
intent to rape is not relevant for purposes of criminal liability—prov-
ing that a forced sexual act occurred with a non-consenting person
is sufficient27—when a man rapes a woman, his intent may include
causing a pregnancy.28 Men also coerce pregnancy through acts of
physical violence outside of the context of sex, primarily through
assaults or threats of assault in response to a woman’s assertion of a
reproductive choice.29 Such acts may include assaulting or threatening
to assault a woman if she uses contraception or if she insists that the
male partner use a condom,30 or if she seeks to obtain an abortion
once pregnant.31
“Pregnancy pressure” or other forms of verbal manipulation
also may be used to coerce a woman into pregnancy.32 These verbal
tactics can include a partner inducing or manipulating a woman into
having sex without contraception or into keeping a pregnancy that she
25. The No MORE Project, Resources, NOMORE.ORG (2010), http://www.nomore.org
/resources, archived at http://perma.cc/K2D8-6LL7.
26. See CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 6.
27. See Duncan, supra note 11, at 1096–1107.
28. As one woman recounted, after raping her, her boyfriend retorted, “What’s the big
deal? . . . It’s not like you couldn’t get your hands on the morning after pill if you actually
cared.” “Libby’s” Story, KNOWMORE (2008), archived at http://perma.cc/E5YD-M6HN.
Another woman reported that when she confronted her partner about his unfaithfulness,
her boyfriend would “force himself” on her sexually, always refusing to wear a condom, and
becoming offended when she suggested he use one. “Janey’s” Story, supra note 7.
29. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 730.
30. See Gina M. Wingood & Ralph J. DiClemente, The Effects of an Abusive Primary
Partner on the Condom Use and Sexual Negotiation Practices of African-American Women,
87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1016, 1016 (1997), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC1380941/pdf/amjph00505-0130.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZPS-8TRW
(assessing the abusive consequences of asking their partners to use condoms through a
private interview with 165 African-American women).
31. See CTR. FOR IMPACT RESEARCH, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND BIRTH CONTROL SABO-
TAGE: A REPORT FROM THE TEEN PARENT PROJECT 22 (2000), available at http://www
.impactresearch.org/documents/dvandbirthcontrol.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5APG
-X9MS (finding that adolescents reported that if they were caught using Depo-Provera
shots, they were “hit or beaten”); Ann M. Moore et al., Male Reproductive Control of Women
Who have Experienced Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, 70 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 1737, 1738 (2010), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/socsci
med201002009.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6W5M-8KLC (reporting that partners
beat up their girlfriends “upon finding her contraception or threatening to kill her if she
has an abortion”). Moore and her colleagues also describe threats to harm a woman if she
keeps a pregnancy. One woman, for example, described her partner’s threat to “throw[ ]
[her] down the steps” if she did not obtain an abortion. Id. at 1741.
32. CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 6.
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otherwise wishes not to;33 threatening to leave a woman if she doesn’t
get pregnant;34 accusing a woman of using birth control in order to be
promiscuous;35 scaring a partner about side effects of birth control
with the intent to prevent her from using it;36 or asserting that if his
girlfriend “really loved” him she would have a baby with him.37 Al-
though this category of pregnancy coercion alone does not impact a
woman’s physical autonomy, when used within a broader relational
context where physical or sexual violence exists, this “pressure” may
trigger similar concerns pertaining to physical safety or autonomy
as would a direct threat of harm. Without the context of violence, preg-
nancy pressure can range from what simply may be a disagreement
over pregnancy within a relationship to a coercive tactic designed to
interfere with a woman’s reproductive decision-making.38
Still another method used to coerce pregnancy falls within the
broad category of what this Article identifies as behavioral birth con-
trol manipulation. These tactics interfere with a woman’s physical
autonomy, but in ways that differ from threats or actual violence.
Examples of behavioral birth control manipulation range from a part-
ner refusing to use a condom;39 a partner withholding money so his
girlfriend cannot purchase needed birth control;40 monitoring girl-
friends’ periods to ensure that they are not taking long-term contra-
ceptive shots;41 promising to “pull out” and then failing to do so;42
and partners barring their girlfriends from seeking an abortion by
removing access to finances or transportation, or sabotaging abortion
appointments.43 Behavioral birth control manipulation commonly
occurs through the intentional sabotage of birth control in an attempt
to void its use or effectiveness.44 Acts of birth control sabotage are
often secretive or subtle, and can include hiding birth control pills by
33. Id.
34. See Margaret Conway, Partner Abuse and Unintended Pregnancy: Making the Con-
nections (April 1, 2010), NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE BLOG, http://www.thehotline
.org/2010/04/partner-abuse-and-unintended-pregnancy-making-the-connections/, archived
at http://perma.cc/W8ED-3JA7.
35. See “Erika’s” Story, supra note 7.
36. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1741.
37. See CTR. FOR IMPACT RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 18.
38. See infra Part IV for further discussion.
39. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1740.
40. See id. at 1738.
41. Teens Susceptible to Reproductive Coercion, NEWSWEEK (July 1, 2010), http://www
.newsweek.com/teens-susceptible-reproductive-coercion-71139, archived at http//perma
.cc/XYZ5-8K85.
42. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 723.
43. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1741.
44. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 721.
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flushing or otherwise destroying pills;45 breaking, removing, or poking
holes in condoms before ejaculating;46 and removing contraceptive
rings or patches during intercourse.47 A man’s control over condom
usage makes its manipulation particularly common.48 Young men
have reported that they “insist” on condomless sex or use condoms
inconsistently, as way to maintain control over their partners.49
While methods used to coerce pregnancy may occur alone, women
often report that their partners use multiple methods.50 In one study,
a quarter of women who called a domestic violence hotline seeking
advice on domestic abuse reported having a partner who pressured
them to become pregnant, told them not to use contraception, or
forced them to have unprotected sex,51 with 16% of those women
also reporting that their partner removed condoms during sex.52 Alone,
these acts can dramatically impact a woman’s reproductive autonomy.
Together, as described by one woman, they can devastate it. As she
recounted it, her partner told her that he:
“[S]hould just get you pregnant and have a baby with you so that
I know you will be in my life forever.” . . . [He] refused condoms and
tried to convince [her] not to use birth control, accus[ed] her of
being unfaithful if she tried. He denied paternity when she became
pregnant. She had two abortions with him, both of which he re-
fused to pay for.53
45. Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1740.
46. Id.; see also Committee Opinion Number 554, infra note 49, at 2; The Facts on
Reproductive Health and Partner Abuse, FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE, archived at
http://perma.cc/S2YM-NK3L.
47. Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1741; Trawick, supra note 16, at 730. An example of
behavioral interference with birth control in order to terminate a pregnancy was captured
in a Reuters article about a man who obtained misoprostol, a medication that can cause
abortion, and switched that with an antibiotic his girlfriend was taking. As a result of
the switch, the girlfriend miscarried the fetus she was carrying. See Jane Sutton, Florida
Man Says He Tricked Girlfriend into Taking Abortion Drug, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2013,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-usa-abortion-florida-idUSBRE
9890W220130910, archived at http://perma.cc/4HW5-3DSW.
48. See CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 12.
49. See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, Committee Opinion Num-
ber 554: Reproductive and Sexual Coercion, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
2 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee
%20on%20Health%20Care%20for%20Underserved%20Women/co554.pdf?dmc=1&ts=
20130623T2032290544, archived at http://perma.cc/G32M-5GNN [hereinafter Committee
Opinion Number 554].
50. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1742.
51. HotlineAdvocate_SA, 1 in 4 Callers Surveyed at the Hotline Report Birth Control
Sabotage and Pregnancy Coercion, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE BLOG (Sept. 19,
2014), http://www.thehotline.org/2011/02/1-in-4-callers-surveyed-at-the-hotline-report
-birth-control-sabotage-and-pregnancy-coercion/, archived at http://perma.cc/56SN-RKCK
[hereinafter 1 in 4 Callers].
52. Id.
53. Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1739–40.
284 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:275
B. The Relational Context of Pregnancy Coercion
Reproductive coercion often occurs within the context of an other-
wise abusive relationship.54 The correlation between reproductive
coercion and intimate partner abuse was quantified in a 2010 study
exploring the intersection of reproductive coercion,55 intimate partner
abuse, and unintended pregnancy.56 In that study, principal investi-
gator Dr. Elizabeth Miller surveyed women and girls seeking services
from numerous California family planning clinics who reported phys-
ical abuse in their intimate relationships. Of those participants, more
than one-third reported some form of reproductive coercion.57 Con-
versely, of participants who reported experiencing reproductive coer-
cion, almost three-quarters reported experiencing intimate partner
abuse.58 Said differently, Dr. Miller found that while in some relation-
ships where violence exists reproductive coercion is used, in relation-
ships where reproductive coercion is used, that relationship likely is
physically violent.
54. See Elizabeth Miller et al., Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence and
Unintended Pregnancy, 81 CONTRACEPTION 316, 316 (2010) (“Nearly one in four women
in the United States report experiencing violence by a current or former spouse or
boyfriend at some point in her life, with adolescents and young adults at highest risk for
intimate partner violence.”).
55. Id. at 317 (labeling birth control sabotage and pregnancy coercion as “repro-
ductive control”).
56. Id. The study obtained data from a sample of 1278 women ages sixteen to twenty-
nine. Id.
57. Id. at 317. To assess whether a participant experienced pregnancy coercion, Dr.
Miller’s study posed six questions:
Has someone you were dating or going out with ever: (1) told you not to use
any birth control (like the pill, shot, ring, etc.); (2) said he would leave you
if you did not get pregnant?; (3) told you he would have a baby with some-
one else if you didn’t get pregnant?; (4) hurt you physically because you did
not agree to get pregnant?; and (5) tried to force or pressure you to become
pregnant?
Id. Participants also were asked if they, “[h]ave . . . ever hidden birth control from a sexual
partner because you were afraid he would get upset with you for using it?” Birth control
sabotage was assessed by asking:
Has someone you were dating or going out with ever: taken off the condom
while you were having sex so that you would get pregnant?; (2) put holes
in the condom so you would get pregnant?; (3) broken a condom on purpose
while you were having sex so you would get pregnant?; (4) taken your birth
control (like pills) away from you or kept you from going to the clinic to get
birth control so that you would get pregnant? Or (5) made you have sex
without a condom so you would get pregnant?
Id. A positive answer to any of these questions indicated that a woman had experienced
birth control sabotage. If a woman experienced overlap between pregnancy coercion and
birth control sabotage, she was identified as having experienced “reproductive control.” Id.
58. See Miller et al., supra note 54, at 319.
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Reproductive coercion and intimate partner abuse are particularly
closely correlated in adolescent relationships.59 Broadly, teens are
more likely to experience abuse and reproductive coercion in their
intimate relationships than are their older counterparts.60 Nearly
one-quarter of teenage girls in abusive relationships report that their
male partners have tried to get them pregnant by interfering with
their use of contraception61—a rate nearly double that of adolescent
girls not in abusive relationships.62 Abusive adolescent boys are less
likely to use condoms than their non-abusive peers, and abused ado-
lescent girls indicate that they are half as likely to use condoms as
compared to girls who are not abused.63 The more severe the physical
violence, the more aggravated the interference with an adolescent
girl’s use of birth control.64 As one abusive teenage boy noted when dis-
cussing his use of condoms:
I also think I know everything about her, like, you know? It’s like
she’s real clean. You know? I know she wasn’t gettin’ with no other
dude. I just . . . I have an instinct about her. She’s not that type of
girl, you know . . . She’s really like my wife now.65
Poor adolescents face significant obstacles to understanding the
coercive context of their relationships or to avoiding those contexts
59. Jody Raphael, Teens Having Babies: The Unexplored Role of Domestic Violence,
12 THE PREVENTION RESEARCHER 15, 16 (2005), available at http://www.tpronline.com
/article.cfm/Teens_Having_Babies__The_Unexpected_Role_of_Domestic_Violence,
archived at http://perma.cc/L5L8-V5GK [hereinafter Raphael, Teens Having Babies].
60. See Lisa Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love Got to Do With It: Securing Access to
Justice for Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 460 (2012); Raphael, Teens Having Babies,
supra note 59, at 16 (finding more than half of the young women surveyed experienced
“some level of domestic violence at the hands of their boyfriends in the last 12 months,”
73% reporting physical violence, and 41% reporting “the most severe levels of domestic
violence (such as kicking, beating, or being threatened with a weapon) within the last
[twelve] months.”); see also Miller et al., supra note 54, at 318.
61. Committee Opinion Number 554, supra note 49, at 1–2.
62. See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 54, at 318 (finding that of women sixteen to twenty
years old, 18% experienced some form of pregnancy coercion, while nearly 12% experienced
birth control sabotage); Elizabeth Miller et al., Male Partner Pregnancy-Promoting Behav-
iors and Adolescent Partner Violence: Findings from a Qualitative Study with Adolescent
Females, 7 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 360 (2007); see also Jody Raphael, Battering Through
the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 367, 371 (2003) [hereinafter
Raphael, Battering Through].
63. See CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 11. Because asking their partner
to wear a condom may be a trigger for abuse, abused girls may be less likely to insist on
the use of condoms during sex. See Wingood & DiClemente, supra note 30, at 1018.
64. Raphael, Teens Having Babies, supra note 59, at 16 (measuring findings based
on study participants’ yes/no responses to behavioral questions); see also Miller et al., supra
note 54, at 364 (utilizing a cross-sectional survey of English and Spanish speaking females
ages sixteen to twenty-nine years old, in five family planning clinics in California).
65. A. Raj et al., Contexts of Condom Use and Non-condom Use Among Young Ado-
lescent Male Perpetrators of Dating Violence, 19 AIDS CARE 970, 972 (2007).
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altogether.66 Yet, for multiple reasons, poor adolescent girls appear to
be at particular risk of reproductive coercion.67 First, poor adolescent
girls are likely to have fewer financial, housing, or educational re-
sources.68 A pregnant adolescent is also likely to be in a relationship
with a significantly older man, which can lead to a unique loss of re-
productive autonomy given the context of the age differential.69 Fi-
nally, many policies severely limit or restrict altogether adolescents’
access to comprehensive sex education or birth control, limiting the
options for understanding or responding to their experiences.70
While the foregoing demonstrates a correlation between repro-
ductive coercion and violence within both adolescent and adult rela-
tionships, that correlation is not exclusive.71 Acts designed to coerce
pregnancy also occur in relationships where sexual or physical vio-
lence is absent or sporadic.72 Although men may engage in repro-
ductive coercion within relationships where they otherwise are not
abusive, such coercion also may precede other forms of abuse.73 If
the relationship continues, it may become physically or sexually vio-
lent.74 Without the direct use of violence, however, controlling a
woman through pregnancy falls squarely within the broad category
66. JUDITH S. MUSICK, YOUNG, POOR, AND PREGNANT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TEENAGE
MOTHERHOOD 71 (1995).
67. Raphael, Battering Through, supra note 62, at 371 (noting that in one study, two-
thirds of adolescent mothers on public assistance experienced birth control sabotage by a
partner); Anna Aizer, The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence, 100 AM. ECON. REV.
1847, 1848 (2010) (“Disadvantaged women face much higher risks of abuse. Women with
annual income below $10,000 report rates of domestic violence five times greater than
those with annual incomes above $30,000.”). This correlation is consistent with the
well-established correlation between domestic violence and poverty generally. Although
domestic violence can be found among all economic classes, studies repeatedly demon-
strate that violence increases as household income decreases. See, e.g., Raphael, Battering
Through, supra note 62, at 367.
68. Raphael, Teens Having Babies, supra note 59, at 17.
69. MUSICK, supra note 66, at 88.
70. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality,
56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1256–57 (2007) (noting that young, poor women face both “the greatest
stigma for sexual activity and the highest barriers to access and information about contra-
ception and abortion”); Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 421, 463–65 (2007) (identifying the burden waiting periods and parental notifi-
cation laws have on poor, rural women); see also infra Part IV for further discussion.
71. See Miller et al., supra note 54, at 318–19.
72. See CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 6; Raphael, Teens Having Babies,
supra note 59, at 16 (noting that one-third of adolescent girls who did not identify as being
in a domestically violent relationship still reported some form birth control sabotage by
their boyfriends); see also Miller et al., supra note 54, at 320 (reproductive coercion in the
absence of physical or sexual violence was experienced by 7% of the participants); Raphael,
Teens Having Babies, supra note 59, at 16 (34% of teens with no domestic violence re-
ported either verbal or behavioral birth control sabotage).
73. See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 54, at 320.
74. See id. at 319.
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of behaviors that sociologist Evan Stark and others have defined as
“coercive control.” 75 Coercive control includes a variety of behaviors
that intentionally deprive intimate partners—usually women—of
their autonomy and liberty.76 Coercive control expands what consti-
tutes abuse within intimate relationships to include acts that “create[ ]
or exploit[ ] conditions that leave the woman vulnerable to control;
undermin[e] the woman’s resistance by depleting her tangible, social,
or personal resources; and establish[ ] and exploit[ ] [her] emotional
dependency.” 77 These acts upset the relational balance and allow the
coercing partner to engage in ongoing strategies that include intimi-
dation and isolation, and that extend into all areas of a woman’s life,
including relations with family, friends and work.78 In short, coercive
control includes behaviors that can severely constrain a person’s
freedom and community.79 Although physical violence is not central
to coercive control, even sporadic violence makes this abusive strategy
particularly effective by reinforcing the credibility of any future
threats that may accompany, or be implied through, the coercive act.80
As Evan Stark has identified, even the mere threat of violence—the
“or else” proviso—can be a strong barrier to action.81
Imposing or attempting to impose a pregnancy upon a woman
falls squarely within the category of exploitive and dependency-
making behaviors that constitute coercive control. The sign of an ab-
domen enlarged from pregnancy is perhaps the single most obvious
indication that a woman is, or has been, involved in an intimate rela-
tionship. Even within the most controlling of relationships, few acts
compare to confining a woman to a term of pregnancy, and potentially
to a lifetime of motherhood and connection to the coercing partner.
Indeed, when asked, some men explicitly state that they coerce preg-
nancy to physically confine or “trap” 82 their partner in the relation-
ship, to claim ownership over the woman, and to “mark” a woman as
75. STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 12–13.
76. See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 36–37 (2012); STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 13 (explaining that the
combination of coercion and control in a relationship is the most common form of abuse
against women).
77. See GOODMARK, supra note 76, at 37.
78. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1121–22 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson,
Redefining Harm].
79. GOODMARK, supra note 76, at 36.
80. Id. at 37.
81. STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 15, 199.
82. See Lynn Harris, When Teen Pregnancy Is No Accident, THE NATION (May 24,
2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/when-teen-pregnancy-no-accident#, archived at
http://perma.cc/YL5-WU25.
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“mine.” 83 Others assert that they coerce pregnancies because of the
notion that women who have children are more “unattractive” to other
men, and, therefore, will be less likely to leave the relationship.84
Within the context of a relationship where violence is or has been
used, resisting acts that coerce pregnancy by insisting on the use of
contraception or otherwise refusing to comply with requests that place
a woman at risk of becoming pregnant may simply be too intimidating,
too coercive, or too dangerous for her to employ. The intimate context
within which pregnancy coercion usually occurs also makes resistance
difficult—vulnerability, sexuality, and intimacy can be difficult to
disentangle from coercive acts or intent. Once pregnant, a woman
may experience emotional, physical, and financial dependence that,
both in the short and long term,85 may be exploited by the batterer
and used to more easily and effectively dominate and control his
pregnant partner.86 The following story chillingly demonstrates an
example of how an extreme desire to control a woman’s reproductive
autonomy can lead to devastating results: Amanda’s 14-year-old son
was murdered by his stepfather following her decision to obtain an
abortion.87 The stepfather murdered her son because, according to
the stepfather, “his mother aborted my kid and, uh, I tried to let it go,
and I couldn’t . . . Look, Amanda killed my kid, you know. That’s just
fucking crazy, she knows who I am. We’re even.” 88
Although there is a limited understanding of what motivates men
to coerce pregnancy beyond (or in addition to) coercive control, addi-
tional theories have been offered. One theory identifies the role of
gang culture, where a male, whose life expectancy is uncertain, may
believe a child could carry on his legacy.89 When that gang member’s
83. Lynn Harris, ‘He Thought a Baby Would Keep Me in His Life Forever’: When
Partner Abuse Isn’t a Bruise But a Pregnant Belly, ALTERNET (June 25, 2009), http://
www.alternet.org/story/140887/%27he_thought_a_baby_would_keep_me_in_his_life
_forever%27%3A_when_partner_abuse_isn%27t_a_bruise_but_a_pregnant_belly, archived
at http://perma.cc/XPW2-SB72.
84. See Raphael, Battering Through, supra note 62, at 370. In one study, women re-
ported higher rates of reproductive coercion before their partners were sent to prison; if she
became pregnant before he left, according to the women, it was unlikely she would leave
him while he was imprisoned because she “would be seen as less desirable by other men
and invested in maintaining a relationship with the father of the child.” Moore et al., supra
note 31, at 1740.
85. See Raphael, Battering Through, supra note 62, at 372; see also infra Part II.D,
“Emotional and Financial Harm,” for a discussion on the financial costs of pregnancy.
86. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81
IND. L.J. 667, 680 (2006).
87. Police: Teen Helped Dad Kill Stepmother, CNN (July 30, 2013), http://www.cnn.com
/video/data/2.0/video/bestoftv/2013/07/30/exp-nr-ky-boy-kills-stepbrother.cnn.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/N4LS-SNMZ.
88. Id.
89. See Lynn Harris, “My Boyfriend Stole My Birth Control”: When Men Force Women
to Get Pregnant Against Their Will, THE NATION (May 28, 2010), http://www.alternet.org
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partner becomes pregnant—through whatever means—his odds of
leaving that legacy increase. Another theory suggests that some cul-
tures, again including gang culture, attribute social standing and
seniority to men who father multiple children with multiple women.90
Still other research suggests that some men coerce pregnancy in an
attempt to secure a nuclear family, countering the coercer’s experience
of growing up in a maladjusted home.91
A final note on the relational contexts for pregnancy coercion:
throughout this Article, I intentionally identify the coercer as male
and the coerced as female. I have labeled the actors in this way for a
variety of reasons, none of which is meant to take away from the expe-
riences of men who have been misled into unwanted or unplanned
fatherhood.92 First, as explored in Part III, the existing cultural nar-
rative that tricking a partner into pregnancy is an act dominated by
women simply is inaccurate.93 This Article offers a counter-narrative
/story/147040/%22my_boyfriend_stole_my_birth_control%22%3A_when_men_force
_women_to_get_pregnant_against_their_will?page=0%2C3&paging=off, archived at http://
perma.cc/RNK9-XMPB.
90. See Conversation: Lynn Harris & Elizabeth Miller on Reproductive Coercion,
supra note 9.
91. Id.
92. For a discussion on the how the definition of “fatherhood” has evolved within the
law, see Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 331–44 (2005).
93. The narrative follows this general storyline: a woman, desperate to have a baby,
misleads her male partner into having unprotected intercourse based on her assertion
that she either had been sterilized or was using some form of hormonal contraception, and
a pregnancy that she wanted, but the male partner did not, resulted. This narrative is
strongly engrained in our social and cultural discourse. See, e.g., Ian Daly, That Was No
“Accident,” DETAILS, http://www.details.com/sex-relationships/marriage-and-kids/200610
/did-your-girlfriend-trick-you-into-fatherhood, archived at http://perma.cc/L7FR-H4MU
(last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (reporting on a story with the following headline: “You two were
careful, but somehow she got pregnant. It happens. Or not. Getting tricked into father-
hood by a woman hell-bent on getting pregnant is much more common than you think.”);
NINE MONTHS (Twentieth Century Fox 1995), available at, http://www.script-o-rama.com
/movie_scripts/n/nine-months-script-transcript-9.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DBB4
-DDJV (following the main character, who becomes pregnant, leading her boyfriend and
best friend to consider whether she intentionally coerced the pregnancy); HONEY CONE,
STICK-UP (Hot Wax 1971), available at http://www.oldielyrics.com/lyrics/hone_con/stick
_up.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8AD9-293Z (“I’ll set a tender trap, he’ll be unaware;
I’ll wear a smile down the aisle; ‘Cause he’s the father of my child.”); THE SPECIALS,
STUPID MARRIAGE, available at http://songmeanings.com/songs/view/115299, archived
at http://perma.cc/H3V7-48C7 (2 Tone Records 1979) (“He wanted to be something but
she knows he never will; She’s got him where she wanted and forgot to take her pill; And
he thinks that she’ll be happy when she’s hanging out the nappies; If that’s a happy mar-
riage I’d prefer to be unhappy”); 2PAC, DO FOR LOVE (Jive Records 1997), available at
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/2pac/doforlove.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AQ5Y
-SGB9 (“Just when I thought I broke away and I’m feeling happy; You try to trap me;
You say you’re pregnant and guess who’s the daddy?”). But see Kathryn Robinson, From
“Broken” Condoms to Pill Tampering: The Realties of Reproductive Coercion, NAT’L
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE BLOG (July 18, 2013), http://www.thehotline.org/2013
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to that dominant cultural assumption. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the phenomenon of pregnancy coercion and the result-
ing harms are unique to women. Although men can be—and are—
misled about their partner’s use of or need for birth control and that
deception can lead to their partners’ pregnancy,94 there is a critical
distinction between a woman exposing herself to the physical, emo-
tional, and financial consequences of pregnancy and another person
using deceptive, manipulative, or physically harmful methods to
expose her to the same.95 Accordingly, although both genders may
engage in deception around contraception use with the goal of induc-
ing a pregnancy, the resulting impact on physical health, reproductive
autonomy, safety and the likelihood that such deception occurs within
the context of a broader abusive relationship compels identifying
pregnancy coercion as a distinctly female experience.96
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE HARMS OF COERCED PREGNANCIES
Almost half of all pregnancies in the United States are unin-
tended.97 Although it is not possible to know how many pregnancies
are unintended due to acts of coercion by intimate partners and how
many are unintended for other reasons (for example birth control fail-
ure or consensual birth control omission), data suggest a significant
correlation between a woman’s lack of control over her reproductive
/07/from-broken-condoms-to-pill-tampering-the-realities-of-reproductive-coercion/,
archived at http://perma.cc/ASD8-RRDF (following Carlos and Gaby, a couple on the show
Desperate Housewives, who “can’t agree on whether or not they should have a baby.
Carlos, anxious to start a family, replaces Gaby’s birth control with sugar pills, which
leads to her getting pregnant. Five seasons (and some children) later, Carlos has again
tricked Gabby, and confesses that he didn’t actually have a vasectomy as he’d told her
he had.”).
94. A 2010 study by the Centers for Disease Control of 23,000 men and women eighteen
or older, found that more men than women were coerced into pregnancy. Specifically,
the CDC’s survey found that 10.4% of men surveyed, as compared to 8.6% of women,
reported ever having an intimate partner who tried to get them pregnant when they did
not want to, or refused to use a condom. BLACK ET AL., supra note 23, at 1, 48. But cf.
Miller et al., supra note 54, at 319 (finding that of women surveyed, 15% reported having
a male partner who sabotaged birth control).
95. See infra Part II.
96. This is not dissimilar from studies that demonstrate that rates of violence within
intimate relationships may be statistically even. Sociologists Michael Johnson, Ellen Pence,
and others, however, have identified that not all violence is the same and have categorized
the violence based on the tactics used. See GOODMARK, supra note 76, at 33–36.
97. See Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States:
Incidence and Disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 480 (2011); Adam Thomas &
Emily Monea, The High Cost of Unintended Pregnancy at 2, CTR. ON CHILD. & FAM. AT
BROOKINGS (July 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files
/papers/2011/7/unintended%20pregnancy%20thomas%20monea/07_unintended_preg
nancy_thomas_monea.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U8Z3-M3EV.
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choices and unintended pregnancy.98 In Dr. Elizabeth Miller’s study,
for example, the combined effect of intimate partner violence and re-
productive coercion doubled the likelihood that a woman would expe-
rience an unintended pregnancy.99 Beyond the physical side effects of
pregnancy, routinely identified in our existing cultural narrative as
potentially difficult if not outright injurious to women,100 pregnancy—
intended or otherwise—can trigger myriad other harms. When the
acts of another cause an unintended pregnancy, the pregnancy itself
can become both an injury and the cause of other harms.101 This sec-
tion explores those direct and causational harms of pregnancy, begin-
ning with the correlation between pregnancy and domestic violence.
A. Pregnancy and Intimate Partner Abuse102
Women who experience abuse in their relationships routinely
report that such abuse begins or intensifies during pregnancy or im-
mediately following the birth of a child.103 Nearly one-third of women
who experience domestic violence report that the first abusive inci-
dent occurred during pregnancy.104 Pregnant women are more likely
to be abused in their intimate relationships than women who are not
pregnant,105 and pregnant women experience abuse more frequently
98. See Miller et al., supra note 54, at 316.
99. Id. at 319; 1 in 4 Callers, supra note 51 (“40% of abused women reported that their
pregnancy was unintended compared to 8% of non-abused women.”).
100. See Bridges, supra note 11, at 463–64; see also Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 917, 935 (2010).
101. See Bridges, supra note 11, at 472–73.
102. Within this section, I use both the phrases “domestic violence” and “intimate partner
abuse.” When referencing physical violence within a relationship, I use the phrase “vio-
lence” or “domestic violence.” When describing more expansive forms of abuse within rela-
tionships, I use the phrase “intimate partner abuse.” I make this distinction, as noted by
Professor Leigh Goodmark, “to capture the broad range of behaviors—beyond physical
violence” that limit the autonomy of women “subjected to abuse in their relationships.”
Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the Legal System,
48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51, 53 n.16 (2013).
103. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 395 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2007);
Douglas A. Brownridge et al., Pregnancy and Intimate Partner Violence: Risk Factors,
Severity, and Health Effects, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 858, 864 (2011); Tuerkheimer,
supra note 88, at 667.
104. NEW JERSEY CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT PREVENTION PLAN: A ROADMAP TO CHILD AND
FAMILY WELL-BEING, DEPT. OF CHILD. AND FAM. 23 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www
.state.nj.us/dcf/documents/about/commissions/njtfcan/PreventionPlan.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/4EYX-JGB4 (quoting a survey by the National Domestic Violence Hotline
and Family Violence Prevention Fund (2011), available at http://www.thehotline.org/2011
/02/1-in-4-callers-to-the-national-domestic-violence-hotline-report-birth-control-sabotage
-and-pregnancy-coercion/, archived at http://perma.cc/V46P-EJ6B).
105. See Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Prevalence of Violence Against Pregnant Women,
275 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1915, 1918 (1996) (finding that as many as 20.1% of pregnant
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and more severely than women who experience abuse before preg-
nancy but not during it.106 Violence during pregnancy is particularly
prevalent when the pregnancy is unintended.107 Women who experi-
ence unintended pregnancy report rates of abuse three to four times
higher than women who intentionally become pregnant.108 Women
marginalized due to cultural stereotypes about age, race, or class109
are at the highest risk for unintended pregnancy. Nearly half of
African American and Latina women and almost 40% of low-income
women have had at least one unintended birth.110 As compared to
their higher-income counterparts, poor women are four times as likely
to have an unintended pregnancy and five times as likely to have an
unintended birth.111 Of all females of childbearing age, however,
adolescent girls are at highest risk for unintended pregnancy. Al-
though rates of teen pregnancy have been steadily declining over the
women experience violence during pregnancy); Mary M. Goodwin et al., Pregnancy Intend-
edness and Physical Abuse Around the Time of Pregnancy: Findings from the Pregnancy
Risk Assessment Monitoring System, 1996–1997, 4 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J., 85,
85–86, 88, 91–92 (2000) (stating that the percentage of women who are physically abused
may be higher in pregnant women than the general female population). But cf. Brownridge
et al., supra note 103, at 871, 976 (stating that pregnancy may be a protective factor for
some women who experience intimate violence).
106. See Judith McFarlane et al., Abuse During Pregnancy and Femicide: Urgent
Implications for Women’s Health, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 27, 28 (2002).
107. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1737.
108. CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 11; Moore et al., supra note 31, at
1737. The prevalence of abuse for women with intended pregnancies is around 5%; for
women with mistimed pregnancies, that rate more than doubles to 12.6%; and for women
experiencing unwanted pregnancies, the rate of abuse is nearly tripled, with 15% reporting
abuse during pregnancy. Goodwin et al., supra note 105, at 85, 90–92 (stating, “[o]verall,
women with unintended pregnancies had 2.5 times the risk of experiencing physical abuse
compared with those whose pregnancies were intended”).
109. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARI-
ZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 90 (2010). 
110. See Susan A. Cohen, Repeat Abortion, Repeat Unintended Pregnancy, Repeated and
Misguided Government Policies, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 8, 9 (2007); Angela Hooton,
A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing Mainstream and Latina
Feminism, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 59, 78 (2005) (noting that approximately
50% of all pregnancies among Latinas are unintended).
111. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 109, at 90.
For those with incomes at 200% of the poverty line, there were 29 unplanned
pregnancies per 1,000 women aged 15–44; for those with incomes at 100%
of the poverty line, there were 81 unplanned pregnancies per 1,000 women
in that age group; and those below the poverty line had 112 unplanned preg-
nancies per 1,000 women, almost four times the rate of the most affluent.
The disparities have increased further in recent years, with poor women’s
unplanned pregnancy rates increasing by 29% while the rate dropped for
the better-off. And the unplanned pregnancies produce even greater dispar-
ities in unplanned births: 11 per 1,000 women for the most affluent groups;
35 per 1,000 for those women at 100% of the poverty line; and 58 per 1,000
for those in poverty, more than five times the rate of the wealthiest group.
Id.
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past twenty years, 615,000 adolescents become pregnant each year,112
and almost all are unintended.113 Half of African American and Latina
teenagers will be pregnant before the age of 20—a rate almost double
the national average.114 Pregnant or parenting adolescents are twice
as likely to experience intimate partner violence than women 18 or
older, with teenage mothers experiencing the highest risk of vio-
lence after pregnancy.115 Indeed, adolescent girls experiencing dat-
ing violence are four times more likely to become pregnant than are
adolescent girls not experiencing dating violence.116 Adolescent girls
in physically abusive relationships experience unintended pregnancies
almost one and a half times more frequently than young women in
non-abusive relationships, and more than one in ten adolescent
mothers report being “physically assaulted by the fathers of their
babies.”117 Indeed, nearly half of all parenting adolescent couples
report some couple violence.118 Young women who experience violence
in their relationships experience a repeat pregnancy within twelve
to eighteen months of an initial pregnancy—a rate higher than those
in non-violent relationships.119 In short, abused adolescents face a
112. Fact Sheet: American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, GUTTMACHER INSTI-
TUTE 1, 3 (June 2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/S2YD-2LFN.
113. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 109, at 8; Finer & Zolna, supra note 97, at 480.
114. Kathryn Kost & Stanley Henshaw, U.S. Teenage Pregnancies, Births and Abortions,
2008: National Trends by Age, Race and Ethnicity, GUTTMACHER INST. 6 (Feb. 2012), avail-
able at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/USTPtrends08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/T7UK-CAVU; Policy Brief: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Teen Pregnancy, THE NAT’L
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 1 (June 2010), available at http://
www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/briefly_policybrief_racialethnicdisparities
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J3VJ-6BZH; see Hooton, supra note 110, at 78.
115. Bradford D. Gessner & Katherine A. Perham-Hester, Experience of Violence Among
Teenage Mothers in Alaska, 22 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 383, 385–86 (1998). Although
some studies suggest adolescents experience violence in their relationships at the same
rate as adult women, others find that they experience higher rates of abuse. Id. at 383,
(noting that adolescent “mothers are more likely to experience violence during and after
pregnancy than older women.”); Martin, supra note 60, at 461 (“[W]omen of ages sixteen
to twenty-four experience the highest rates of violence by current or former intimate
partners.”); Miller et al., supra note 54, at 316, 318.
116. Jay G. Silverman et al., Dating Violence Against Adolescent Girls and Associated
Substance Abuse, Unhealthy Weight Control, Sexual Risk Behavior, Pregnancy and
Suicidality, 286 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 572, 577 (2001).
117. Constance M. Wiemann et al., Pregnant Adolescents: Experiences and Behaviors
Associated with Physical Assault by an Intimate Partner, 4 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J.
93, 96 (2000); Miller et al., supra note 54, at 320 (finding that 45.7% of women who experi-
ence intimate partner violence have unintended pregnancies, compared to 35.3% of women
who have no experience intimate partner violence who have unintended pregnancies).
118. See Bernie Sue Newman & Caroline Campbell, Intimate Partner Violence Among
Pregnant and Parenting Latina Adolescents, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2635, 2636
(2011).
119. See Mark Jacoby et al., Rapid Repeat Pregnancy and Experiences of Interpersonal
Violence Among Low-Income Adolescents, 16 AM. J. PREV. MED 318, 319 (1999) (noting
that the study considered women between ages of thirteen and twenty-one).
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high risk of unintended pregnancies, which are likely to follow—or
to increase—intimate partner violence.120
Intimate partner abuse during pregnancy can result in significant
health-related harms for women and their fetuses.121 Physical violence
during pregnancy is routinely directed towards a woman’s womb.
Pregnant women abused during pregnancy routinely report being
kicked or punched in the abdomen by their partner.122 A women who
experiences violence during pregnancy is also at significant risk of
additional harms to both herself and her fetus. Those harms include
increased risk of abusing controlled substances and smoking; un-
healthy diet; low weight gain; infections; anemia; and low birth
weight.123 Abused pregnant women are also more likely than women
who are not abused during pregnancy to suffer psychological conse-
quences, including anxiety and depression, and are more likely to
attempt suicide.124 As summarized by one set of researchers, “abuse
during pregnancy is a major threat to the health and survival of
pregnant women.”125
Although research suggests that 4–8% of all pregnant women
experience abuse, this number likely grossly underestimates the
120. Beyond the harms associated with violence itself, adolescent girls abused during
pregnancy are more likely to abuse substances than pregnant adolescents who are not
experiencing such violence. See Lisa Espinosa & Kathryn Osborne, Domestic Violence
During Pregnancy: Implications for Practice, 47 J. OF MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH
305, 307 (2002). Pregnant and parenting teens who report partner violence also report
experiencing significant social, educational, and psychological harms, including “higher
rates of school dropout, higher stress and depression scores, and increased substance use
during pregnancy.” Angie C. Kennedy & Larry Bennett, Urban Adolescent Mothers
Exposed to Community, Family, and Partner Violence: Is Cumulative Violence Exposure
a Barrier to School Performance and Participation?, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 750,
753 (2006) (citations omitted).
121. Janel M. Leone et al., Effects of Intimate Partner Violence on Pregnancy Trauma
and Placental Abruption, 19 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1501, 1504 (2010) (finding that 3.7%
of women who gave birth between January 2000 and March 2002 in a Northeastern city
were subjected to intimate partner violence, resulting in higher rates of pregnancy trauma
and placental abruption).
122. See West, supra note 11, at 98.
123. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 88, at 672–73; see also Moore et al., supra note 31, at
1737 (citation omitted) (noting that research supports the conclusion that “intimate partner
violence is associated with unwanted pregnancy, women not using their preferred contra-
ceptive method, sexually transmitted infections including HIV/AIDS, miscarriages, repeat
abortion, a high number of sexual partners, and poor pregnancy outcomes.”).
124. See Sandra L. Martin et al., Pregnancy-Associated Violent Deaths: The Role of
Intimate Partner Violence, 8 TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 135, 145 (2007) (citing two studies
that found between 30–40% of pregnancy-associated suicide victims had a history of inti-
mate partner violence, and that battered women more likely to attempt suicide than non-
battered women); Christie L. Palladino et al., Homicide and Suicide During the Perinatal
Period: Findings From the National Violent Death Reporting System, 118 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1056, 1060 (2011) (finding 54% of pregnancy-associated suicides occurred
by women experiencing problems with current or former intimate partner).
125. McFarlane et al., supra note 106, at 28.
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number of pregnant women who are actually abused.126 Women
abused during pregnancy are more likely than non-abused women
to avoid or delay prenatal care,127 creating a barrier to accurate data
collection and even reliable anecdotal evidence. Indeed, the factor with
the greatest impact on timing for a woman to obtain prenatal care is
whether a pregnancy is wanted—when a pregnancy is unwanted, the
odds of prenatal care are dramatically reduced.128 Women abused dur-
ing pregnancy also may not be able to readily access needed health
care, or may delay obtaining such care, because of their partner’s
imposed restrictions, their young age, or their lack of the necessary
financial resources or access to such care.129 Pregnant women expe-
riencing abuse who do obtain prenatal care may be unlikely to report
the abuse due to fear that reporting may trigger additional abuse
from her partner, or may prompt the medical provider to report.130
Women may also experience shame or fear of judgment from being
abused while pregnant, or simply may not report abuse because of
an investment in their relationship or a recognition that they will
need to co-parent with the abusive partner, or both.131 Even women
who disclose abuse during pregnancy may not specifically identify
reproductive coercion as part of their abusive experience because the
coercion may be secretive,132 because it is not readily named in our cul-
ture as a form of abuse, or to name it as abuse may feel inaccurate
or embarrassing. Finally, because reproductive coercion often occurs
within a broader context of abuse, a woman may feel that other forms
of abuse are more dangerous or relevant to disclose than acts that
infringe upon her reproductive autonomy.133
126. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 88, at 670.
127. See Espinosa & Osborne, supra note 120, at 308 (many women experiencing inti-
mate partner abuse who do seek prenatal care do not do so until the third trimester). But
see Deanna L. Pagnini & Nancy E. Reichman, Psychosocial Factors and the Timing of Pre-
natal Care Among Women in New Jersey’s HealthStart Program, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
56, 62 (2000).
128. See Pagnini & Reichman, supra note 127, at 60.
129. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1737; Committee Opinion Number 554, supra
note 49, at 2.
130. See ELAINE J. ALPERT, MASS. MEDICAL SOCIETY COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE INTERVEN-
TION AND PREVENTION: 8 (2004), available at http://www.massmed.org/partnerviolence/,
archived at http://perma.cc/SYA7-U2CQ.
131. See Julia Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning With the Boundaries
of Sex Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 76 (2008) (identifying similar
reasons for not reporting abuse in an employment context); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom
from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Pro-
tection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 350 (identifying similar reasons for women delaying
seeking redress through the court system for domestic violence).
132. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1742.
133. Intimate Partner Violence During Pregnancy: A Guide for Clinicians, CTR. FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/violence/IntimatePartnerViolence
/sld001.htm#2, archived at http://perma.cc/MF8M-EDJ5 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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B. Pregnancy and Homicide
There is perhaps no data more sobering, or more supportive
of the conclusion that a coerced pregnancy imposed on a woman can
be harmful to her, than the data that murder by an intimate part-
ner is a leading cause of death among pregnant and post-partum
women.134 More pregnant women die from murder by an intimate
partner than from pregnancy-related bleeding, improper development
of the placement, or preeclampsia.135 In one study of women who
died while pregnant, homicide accounted for 20% of deaths, while
embolisms—identified in multiple medical publications as a “leading
cause of maternal mortality in the developed world”—comprised
only 9% of deaths.136 Most women murdered during pregnancy die
during their first trimester137 and most experience violent deaths.138
Predictably, homicide during pregnancy often follows prenatal
physical abuse: Women abused during pregnancy are three times
more likely to be murdered than are women who were abused before
becoming pregnant.139 More than a quarter of all women who were
pregnant when an attempted femicide occurred had been abused
during pregnancy.140 When a woman is pregnant, in an abusive rela-
tionship, and African American, she faces the highest risk of being
killed by an intimate partner;141 African American women are up to
seven times as likely as white women to be murdered while pregnant
or in the year following childbirth.142 When between the ages of
134. See McFarlane et al., supra note 106, at 33 (noting that studies conducted in New
York City, Chicago, Maryland and Virginia all found that homicide was the leading cause
of maternal mortality); Palladino et al., supra note 124, at 1061 (2011) (citing one study
where 38% of postpartum female homicide victims were killed by a boyfriend, husband,
or ex-husband); Jeani Chang et al., Homicide: A Leading Cause of Injury Deaths Among
Pregnant and Postpartum Women in the United States, 1991–1999, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 471, 472 (2005) (noting that of all pregnancy-associated injury deaths, homicide
ranked second, behind only deaths of pregnant women caused by motor vehicle accidents).
135. See Palladino et al., supra note 124, at 1059.
136. See McFarlane et al., supra note 106, at 28; Michael D. Benson, Pulmonary Embo-
lism in Pregnancy: Consensus and Controversies, 64 MINERVA GINECOLOGICA 387, 387
(2012); Ghada Bourjeily et al., Pulmonary Embolism in Pregnancy, 375 LANCET 500, (2010).
137. See Diana Cheng & Isabelle L. Horon, Intimate-Partner Homicide Among Preg-
nant and Postpartum Women, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1181, 1185 (2010).
138. See id. at 1182 (most women who die during pregnancy are shot, stabbed, or
strangled).
139. See Chang et al., supra note 134, at 474.
140. See McFarlane et al., supra note 106, at 27.
141. Homicide rates are highest for pregnant all women in their early twenties and for
women who are unmarried and who lack a high school education. See McFarlane et al.,
supra note 106, at 27; Palladino et al., supra note 124, at 1061; see also Chang et al., supra
note 134, at 472.
142. See McFarlane et al., supra note 106, at 28; Chang et al., supra note 134, at 472.
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25–29, the homicide rate for pregnant black women increases to more
than ten times the rate of white women.143
Despite these data, homicide during pregnancy remains a stag-
geringly hidden issue. The silence around the homicide rates for
women, and particularly women of color, may be attributable in part
to our culture’s judgment of women that fall within certain categories
of women—“the ‘single’ mother, the ‘young’ mother’, [and] the ‘Black’
mother.”144 Our culture blames these categories of women for preg-
nancy and any accompanying harms more harshly than it does
the “paradigmatic” (and therefore more “sympathetic”) expectant
mother.145 Lacey Peterson—white, married, middle class and mur-
dered while pregnant—may be etched in our sociocultural memory due
to the heavy media coverage and national outrage over her murder.146
Dawna Denise Wright and Shantay Wheeler, on the other hand,
were black, young, and also murdered while pregnant, and received
limited media coverage and no collective cultural anger.147
The motivations of men who coerce pregnancy and those who
kill their partner once she becomes pregnant are unclear and, in fact,
appear to be incongruous. Why would a man coerce his partner into
pregnancy and then abuse or kill her once she becomes pregnant?
Killing a pregnant partner appears to defeat the offered explanation
that men coerce pregnancy to leave a legacy, or to bind the coercer
and the coerced together through a child. Though it is possible that
men who coerce pregnancy and men who kill or abuse their preg-
nant partners are two distinct groups of men, it is more likely that
these behaviors fall within the often contradictory acts that exist in
relationships dominated by abuse and control. Within such rela-
tionships, inconsistent behaviors often are used to limit a woman’s
freedom, autonomy, and movement.148 Pregnancy or abuse can re-
sult in limiting all three, indicating that the apparent inconsistency
between coercing pregnancy and then abusing or killing the preg-
nant partner may not be inconsistent at all. Coercing a pregnancy
and the corresponding violence may simply be means to the same
end—both can significantly limit a woman’s freedom to leave a
relationship out of fear or need (or both), or result in her death.
143. Chang et al., supra note 134, at 472.
144. Melissa Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court Proceedings, 36
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 577 (2012).
145. Id. at 586.
146. See Lindsay Goldwert, Murdered Pregnant Women: The Racial Divide, CBSNEWS,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/murdered-pregnant-women-the-racial-divide, archived at
http://perma.cc/F77B-Z3EG (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
147. Id.
148. Trawick, supra note 16, at 724.
298 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:275
Another possible explanation for these seemingly contradictory be-
haviors is that the coercing partner has an unanticipated reaction
to his partner’s pregnancy: once a woman becomes pregnant, the
coercer may experience jealousy over the fetus or identify the fetus
as a “direct threat and rival for their partner’s attention,”149 or may
identify an unanticipated loss of the “primary position”150—or the
perceived loss of that position—within a woman’s life.151 Relatedly,
pregnancy can also result in a period of drastic change in a relation-
ship, where a woman’s attentions may be elsewhere; where there
might be increased stress (financial or otherwise) related to the
pregnancy; disbelief (or an excuse of disbelief) over paternity;152 or
because of a pregnant woman’s decreased physical or emotional
availability during pregnancy.153 To regain a position of importance
or reassert control within the relationship, a partner may assert
dominance through violence, including murder.154
C. Autonomy, Self-Identity, and Dignity
1. Pregnancy and Sense of Self
A woman’s control over her reproduction can be central to her
sense of autonomy and self-identity.155 Many women anticipate the
experience of pregnancy for most of their lives, with an assumption
that they will have control over when and how they will experience it.
When pregnancy occurs under conditions imposed rather than chosen,
a woman loses the “authority to construct pregnancy and motherhood
for” herself;156 she is simultaneously separated her from, and reduced
149. Brownridge et al., supra note 103, at 874.
150. See Kim Curtis, Murder Not Uncommon Cause of Death for Pregnant Women,
NapaValleyRegister.com (Apr. 24, 2003), http://www.napavalleyregister.com/news/murder
-not-uncommon-cause-of-death-for-pregnant-women, archived at http://perma.cc/4NGQ
-B6VC.
151. Id.
152. See Brownridge et al., supra note 103, at 874.
153. Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1737; see also Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Violence
and Reproductive Health: Current Knowledge and Future Research Directions, 4 MATERNAL
& CHILD HEALTH J. 75, 80 (2000) (“[W]omen whose pregnancy was unintended had two
to four times the risk of experiencing physical violence as did women whose pregnancy
was planned.”).
154. See Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1337.
155. See Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration
of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 372–74 (1995); see also Margaret E. Johnson, Balanc-
ing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 543–44 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Balancing Liberty].
156. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of the Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideol-
ogy of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset
of the Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1208 (1992); Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1740.
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to, her reproductive capabilities.157 As Professor Julia Hanigsberg has
written, “taking away women’s ability to control their decision not
to become mothers can be severely damaging to their very sense of
self, for this denial of decisionmaking divides women from their
wombs and uses their wombs for purpose unrelated to women’s own
aspirations.”158 Within the context of rape, Professor Khiara Bridges
considers what constitutes the “injury” that allows for aggravating
factor findings in criminal rape cases when a pregnancy results.159
Professor Bridges explores numerous possible “injuries,” including:
the childbirth or abortion that may result from the pregnancy, the
physical changes that accompany pregnancy, and the fetus itself as
the injury of pregnancy.160 For various reasons, Professor Bridges
rejects each of these as the injury women sustain when becoming
pregnant through rape. Instead, she identifies what she calls the
“abstracted notion of pregnancy as the injury.”161 She explains:
[t]he injury is the woman’s knowledge that she is pregnant, even
when the pregnancy has not produced any substantial, or even
noticeable, physical effects. The injury is the alteration of a rape
victim’s identity from ‘woman’ to ‘pregnant woman.’ The injury
is the fact that the woman thinks of herself differently.162
Although for many women—most, perhaps—an altered self-identity
from “woman” to “pregnant woman” is a positive and welcomed
change, for a woman who becomes pregnant under conditions not
defined or anticipated by her, the pregnancy can result in a deep dis-
orientation, bringing disruption to her self-identity.163
2. Regulation of Pregnant Women
Pregnancy exposes women to increased State involvement in
ways dissimilar from any other medical condition. Pregnant women
routinely experience direct and indirect restrictions on medical deci-
sions when those decisions are deemed harmful to their fetuses.164
While pregnant, a woman often loses her ability to direct “control of
157. EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO
CONSENT 103 (1996); Hanigsberg, supra note 155, at 372, 382–83.
158. Hanigsberg, supra note 155, at 372.
159. Bridges, supra note 11, at 485.
160. See id. at 487. This argument was first advanced by Eileen McDonagh in her
book. See MCDONAGH, supra note 157, at 103.
161. Bridges, supra note 11, at 488.
162. Id.
163. See Motro, supra note 100, at 927.
164. Id.
300 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:275
[her own] body, the caretaking of [herself] and the freedom of move-
ment.”165 The rise of fetal personhood statutes has served as an impe-
tus for many of these regulations.166 Decisions to refuse therapies that
may place the mother’s safety or health at risk, or that are contrary to
her assessment of risk or value system, are routinely superseded by
medical and court intervention when those decisions are deemed
harmful to her unborn fetus.167 This increased regulation of the
behaviors and choices of pregnant women is often in direct conflict
with her dignity and her ability to exercise reproductive or personal
autonomy.168
The most notable ways that pregnant women have been exposed
to State regulation over the past two decades has been through in-
creased policies regarding mandatory drug testing.169 Drug testing
has become routinized across the country for women who are “deter-
mined to have potentially exposed their fetuses to controlled sub-
stances. . . .”170 Although the stated regulatory intent of mandatory
drug testing laws is a medical one—to protect the life of the fetus,171
women with addictions often are exposed to criminal and civil lia-
bility for their drug use during pregnancy.172 Pregnant addicts who
seek prenatal care or medical assistance with labor are likely to be
tested and, if positive, exposed to criminal prosecution, involvement
with the child welfare system, and potentially incarceration.173 Preg-
nant African American women face significantly higher risk of manda-
tory testing, and higher exposure to prosecution and involvement
165. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 155, at 543 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974–75 (1991)).
166. See, e.g., A.J. Stone, Consti-tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run Around Abortion
Rights After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOCIAL POL’Y & L. 471,
503–04 (2000).
167. See Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulation of the Poor, 25 YALE J. LAW & FEMINISM
(forthcoming); Hanigsberg, supra note 155, at 373; Ikemoto, supra note 156, at 1236–48
(describing pregnant women who have experienced forced Cesareans, forced hospital
deliveries, forced life support and forced prenatal treatment by subordinating the interests
of the woman to the interests of the fetus); Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419, 1430–31 (1991). A stark example is a woman whose wishes for no life-saving mea-
sures when in a coma were ignored in order to preserve her fetus. See Ikemoto, supra
note 156, at 1208; see also Florida Hospital Says It Will Force Pregnant Woman to Have
Cesarean Surgery; Federal Court Won’t Issue Emergency Order to Prevent Forced Surgery,
NAT. ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (July 25, 2014), http://advocatesforpregnant
women.org/blog/2014/07/press_release_florida_hospital.php, archived at http://perma.cc
/N79H-V7QG.
168. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 155, at 543.
169. Bach, supra note 166 (manuscript at 28–29).
170. Id. (manuscript at 28).
171. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 343–44 (1992).
172. Id. at 329–30.
173. See Roberts, supra note 166, at 1430–31.
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with the child welfare system based on the results of that testing
than do other races.174 Mandatory drug testing and other similar
regulations are rooted in our culture’s desire to manage the behavior
of pregnant women, particularly women of color who “society views
as undeserving to be mothers and to discourage them from having
children.”175 One result of such regulations is that drug-addicted
women avoid medical care altogether, exposing themselves and their
fetuses to more significant, and potentially more harmful, health-
related risks.176
Justification for regulating the behavior of pregnant women is
based in large part on the premise that “a pregnant woman is a
mother who should think and act first and foremost to protect the
health of the fetus she carries. . . .”177 As explored in Part III, infra,
there is a strong assumption that behavior during pregnancy is indica-
tive of future parenting behavior. Behaviors that are assumed to
pose a risk of harm to a fetus are determined to be equivalent to a
risk of harm to a born child.178 These ideas reinforce the inextricable
link in our culture and our laws between pregnancy and mother-
hood,179 as “even women who are merely pregnant are subject to regu-
latory frameworks inspired by viewing pregnant women as already
being mothers.”180
D. Emotional and Financial Harm
Unintended pregnancies broadly can force women into choosing
abortions they would rather not have, or cannot afford to have;181 to
experience a miscarriage, which can be painful and lead to future
reproductive complications;182 to give up a born child for adoption;183
174. See Bach, supra note 166, at 38–39.
175. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 484–86 (4th Cir. 1999) (Blake, J.
dissenting in part) (highlighting that African American women made up 90% of all arrests
of state hospital policy to arrest and prosecute drug-abusing women); Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (striking down urine test policy for suspected drug
abusing women on Fourth Amendment grounds); Roberts, supra note 166, at 1435–36;
see also Breger, supra note 144, at 557–58.
176. MARSHA ROSENBAUM & KATHERINE IRWIN, DRUGPOLICY.ORG, Pregnancy, Drugs,
and Harm Reduction, http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/309_318_Rosenbaum.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/R5GF-GFXC (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
177. Ikemoto, supra note 156, at 1235.
178. See Bach, supra note 166 (manuscript at 28–29) (noting that although studies
support conclusion that cocaine does not harm a fetus, women still are prosecuted for
using it during pregnancy).
179. Hanigsberg, supra note 155, at 394-95.
180. Id at 374.; see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001) (finding
that involuntary drug testing of pregnant women violates the Fourth Amendment).
181. See Motro, supra note 100, at 918–19.
182. See Ingrid H. Lok & Richard Neugebauer, Psychological Morbidity Following Mis-
carriage, 21 BEST PRAC. & RES. CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 229, 229 (2007).
183. See STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 284.
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or to keep a child that they cannot financially afford to care for, are
not emotionally prepared to care for, or simply do not want.184 The con-
sequences of any of these options may result in significant emotional
harm, including depression and grief.185 Women experiencing unin-
tended pregnancies suffer higher rates of mental-health disorders
than do women experiencing intended pregnancies.186 The potential
for emotional harm is augmented when the unintended pregnancy
results from the coercive act of another: Women who experience unin-
tended pregnancy through reproductive coercion may feel degraded,
threatened, or humiliated, which may in turn impact their feelings
towards the pregnancy, the fetus, and even themselves.187
Women experiencing unintended pregnancies also may be forced
to face harmful—if not devastating—financial burdens.188 If she
chooses to abort the child, she may need to pay for the abortion, given
the severe limitations on state-funded abortions,189 or pay for RU486,
the “abortion pill,” which can cost between $300 and $800.190 If she
chooses to keep the pregnancy, she may have significant financial
burdens resulting from her prenatal and post-partum care. She also
may be limited in her ability to work during pregnancy or immediately
post-partum, which may result in extreme financial hardship.191
This hardship may occur despite protection from laws such as Title
VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which are both substan-
tively and practically limited in their protections.192 And, of course,
if a child ultimately results from the pregnancy, a mother may be
exposed to incredible financial burdens not only in terms of direct
costs of raising a child, but also by limiting her access to education and
significantly reducing her future earning capacity.193
184. Id.
185. See Lok & Neugebauer, supra note 182, at 229.
186. See Thomas & Monea, supra note 97, at 2.
187. See discussion infra Part III.
188. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500–01 (1974), (Brennan, J., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted) (“[T]he economic effects caused by pregnancy-related disabilities are function-
ally indistinguishable from the effects caused by any other disability: wages are lost due
to a physical inability to work, and medical expenses are incurred for the delivery of the
child and for postpartum care.”).
189. Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for
Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12, 13 (2007), http://www
.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/1/gpr100112.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JD4E-4PZZ.
190. The Abortion Pill, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://plannedparenthood.org/health
-info/abortion/the-abortion-pill, archived at http://perma.cc/X3Z-KJXK (last visited Jan. 28,
2015).
191. See Motro, supra note 100, at 928.
192. Id.
193. See STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 279. Beyond the financial burdens
individual pregnant women may experience, unintended pregnancies impose considerable
costs on taxpayers. In 2010, Americans spent $12 billion dollars for publicly financed medi-
cal care for women who experienced unintended pregnancies and on infants who were
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III. THE INVISIBILITY OF REPRODUCTIVE COERCION: CULTURAL AND
LEGAL NARRATIVES OF PREGNANCY
Despite its increasingly understood prevalence, reproductive coer-
cion remains a relatively invisible form of intimate partner abuse.194
This invisibility is due in large part to existing narratives of preg-
nancy that connect it to nature, sex, motherhood, and even abortion.195
This section explores how these narratives hinder our ability and
desire to isolate pregnancy itself as something that may be harmful,
particularly when experienced through deceitful, manipulative, or
threatening means.
A. Pregnancy is Natural
Most physical consequences of pregnancy fall within a vast space
within our culture of “normal,” even when those consequences result
in pain or discomfort, or place limitations on a woman’s movement
or activity.196 This normalization of pregnancy’s side effects stem from
its identification as a natural, biological occurrence. “To understand
a healthy pregnancy without any medical complications” as something
harmful to women, “is to challenge positive constructions of pregnancy
as a necessarily ‘good’ thing that happens to women; it is to under-
stand a pregnancy as being an injury.”197 To be sure, the vast majority
of women who become pregnant survive and manage well,198 with
many experiencing multiple pregnancies in their lifetimes. However,
conceived unintentionally. See Thomas & Monea, supra note 97, at 2. This amount includes
public spending for abortions, miscarriages, births and infant medical care. On average,
a publicly financed, unintended pregnancy costs taxpayers nearly $10,000. Id. at 3.
194. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 722 (arguing that birth control sabotage should be
categorized as a form of domestic violence); see also Erin N. Marcus, Screening For Abuse
May Be Key To Ending It, NY TIMES (May 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20
/health/20abus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/U5RU-X7B2
(arguing that despite recommendations by the American Medical Association and other pro-
fessional, medical organizations, “screening for domestic abuse in seemingly healthy
women is nowhere near as widespread among doctors as testing for breast cancer or high
cholesterol”); Barbara Gerbert et al., Simplifying Physicians’ Response to Domestic Vio-
lence, 172 W. J. OF MED. 329, 329 (2000) (noting physicians do not routinely screen for
domestic violence); Virginia A. Moyer, Screening for Intimate Partner Violence and Abuse
of Elderly and Vulnerable Adults: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation
Statement, 158 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 478, 479 (2013) (identifying a benefit to
physician screening women of reproductive age for intimate partner abuse).
195. Hanigsberg, supra note 155, at 394–95.
196. See Bridges, supra note 11, at 490–97 (discussing other aspects of our laws where
pregnancy is identified as an injury).
197. Id. at 509.
198. Despite the overwhelming survival rate, thousands of women in developing coun-
tries still die each year from preventable causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. See
Maternal Mortality Fact Sheet No. 348, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2012), http://www.who.int
/mediacentre/factsheets/fs348/en/, archived at http://perma.cc/7S63-K7RF.
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despite its biological normalcy, even the most wanted of pregnancies
impose significant physical strain on a woman’s body.199 Pregnancy’s
side effects are vast, and range from nausea and vomiting to extreme
fatigue, “back pain, labored breathing, or water retention.” 200 Six out
of ten women who experience pregnancy and childbirth need treat-
ment for a medical complication, and three out of ten need treatment
for major pregnancy related medical complications.201 Women who
become pregnant face a risk of gestational diabetes, gestational high
blood pressure, and preeclampsia, a condition that can affect a
woman’s kidney, liver, lungs, and brain, and, when untreated, can
result in death.202 Labor and delivery impose “extraordinary physical
demands” on a woman, ranging from what can be multi-hour vaginal
deliveries to Caesarians, highly invasive surgeries that account for
one-third of births and are associated with serious injury and death.203
Pregnancy significantly increases a woman’s uterine size, her pulse
rate, and her body weight;204 and it can result in preterm birth and
miscarriage, both of which can have negative effects on a woman’s
physical and emotional health, even if the pregnancy was unplanned
or unwanted.205
There are limited contexts within our sociolegal system where
pregnancy itself is identified as an injury sustained by a woman for
which a remedy should be available. U.S. abortion policies provide one
such context. Although abortion remains a fiercely polarizing topic
in the United States, broad consensus exists among political and social
ideologies that when a pregnancy threatens the life of a mother,
abortion should be an available medical option.206 Comparatively,
199. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992); see also Motro, supra note 100, at 923–26 (identifying multiple side effects of
pregnancy, including “diabetes, urinary or fecal incontinence, and uterine, bladder, or
kidney infections”).
200. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience
of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 126 (1989); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 U.S. 125, 142
(1976) (highlighting a policy that distinguished pregnancy from other forms of illness or
injury because it is a “temporary disability unique to the female sex and more or less to be
anticipated during the working life of most women employees”); MCDONAGH, supra note
157, at 28 (explaining the Court’s holding that the burdens imposed by pregnancy are
generally within the range of being “normal as long as they do not threaten a woman’s
health or life”).
201. Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 200, at 126.
202. See THE PREECLAMPSIA FOUNDATION, Facts, PRECLAMPSIA.ORG (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.preeclampsia.org/health-information/faq#prezero, archived at http://perma
.cc/WB6Q-2UYC.
203. Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 200, at 126.
204. Id. at 126 (explaining that a woman’s uterine size increases “500–1000 times, her
pulse rate by ten to fifteen beats a minute, and her body weight by 25 pounds or more.”).
205. See Lok & Neugebauer, supra note 182, at 239.
206. Juliet Eilperin & Scott Clement, If Gay Marriage and Pot Are Now Ok, Why Isn’t
Abortion?, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp
2015] COERCING PREGNANCY 305
when a woman is raped but her life is not endangered, support for
abortion decreases, with support at its lowest when a woman seeks
an abortion to avoid marrying the father.207 Our laws mirror these
cultural views. The Supreme Court has repeatedly found that no
matter how dramatically depicted, or what physical consequences
result, all pregnancies are “normal as long as they do not threaten
a woman’s health or life.” 208 Federal Medicaid funding to terminate
a pregnancy is available only in cases where the “life of the mother
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term” or if the preg-
nancy occurred through rape or incest.209 Because the vast majority
of pregnancies do not occur through rape, and because most women’s
pregnancies are not life-threatening,210 these restrictions support
the presumption that while perhaps uncomfortable, complicated, or
painful, women should endure pregnancy’s physical consequences—
regardless of whether that pregnancy resulted within the context of
a violent relationship, or through coercive techniques—unless those
consequences are extreme.
Beyond the context of federally funded abortions, there exist
other limited contexts where despite its biological normalcy, preg-
nancy itself may arguably be identified itself as harmful to a woman.
Within the context of rape, pregnancy constitutes “serious bodily
injury” for purposes of most jurisdictions’ rape laws,211 subjecting a
rapist to an aggravated crime and an increased prison sentence (as
compared to a victim who does not become pregnant).212 In iden-
tifying pregnancy as a distinct and separate injury from the rape
itself, legislatures have recognized that “pregnancy and the resulting
consequences are not injuries necessarily incidental to an act of rape
/2013/04/12/if-gay-marriage-and-pot-are-now-ok-why-not-abortion/, archived at http://
perma.cc/NBV-2CV8.
207. Id. Of course, the question regarding whether the father was abusive to her, or
whether she wanted to avoid marrying him because the pregnancy was coerced, was not
part of that survey.
208. Prior to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello held that California’s decision to exclude from its
unemployment compensation disability program disabilities resulting from “normal”
pregnancies was not “invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”
417 U.S. 484, 485 (1974). “Normal” pregnancies are identified as being “an objectively iden-
tifiable physical condition with unique characteristics.” Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 677, n. 12 (1983).
209. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat 786 (2011)
(“The Hyde Amendment”).
210. See, e.g., Melissa M. Holmes et al., Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and
Descriptive Characteristics From a National Sample of Women, 175 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 320, 320 (1996).
211. Bridges, supra note 11, at 467–68.
212. See id. at 458.
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and, consequently, can warrant an increased punishment if caused
by a sexual assault.” 213 Although pregnancy is identified as a distinct
injury, the intent of the rapist in causing the pregnancy is not relevant
to a conviction—the fact that a pregnancy resulted is sufficient.214
Outside of the context of rape, a pregnancy imposed upon a woman
through threat of harm or even immediately following a physical
assault, is not recognized as a distinct injury, even if the harms that
befall a woman are similar to those harms that may result to a woman
who became pregnant through rape or sexual assault.215
Finally, pregnancy has been recognized as constituting a distinct
harm within the context of certain types of medical negligence.216 In
those case, parents have recovered damages based on a physician’s
negligence that resulted in an unplanned child, or where a child
born with significant disabilities could have been prevented or
aborted had the parents received competent advice during the
pregnancy.217 Damages awarded in medical negligence cases are
almost always tied to the costs associated with raising the child
with a disability, or the direct medical costs associated with the
pregnancy and raising the child.218 Damages are not awarded for the
impact becoming pregnant has on a woman’s altered sense of self or
because of the infringement upon her autonomy that a pregnancy
imposes.219 Awarding costs directly tied to the birth of a child, and
not as compensation for a woman’s experience as a pregnant woman
is “a vital distinction” 220 that reinforces the cultural and legal normali-
zation of the experience of being pregnant, and it’s positive construc-
tion, whatever the conditions that caused it.
B. Pregnancy’s Inextricable Link to Sex and Motherhood
Because of its relatively brief temporal nature, the narrative of
pregnancy often is not considered in isolation, but rather within the
213. See id. at 469.
214. Id. at 469 (articulated standard in Hagenkord v. State, 302 N.W.2d 421, 437 (Wis.
1981)).
215. Id. at 476–77.
216. Bridges, supra note 11, at 497–98.
217. Id. at 497–501.
218. Motro, supra note 100, at 961.
219. Bridges, supra note 11, at 500 (“[C]ourts do not attempt to compensate victorious
plaintiffs for having been injured by a pregnancy that they wish they did not have to
bear. . . . [or] attempt to compensate plaintiffs for the mental and emotional costs of bearing
a pregnancy that is unwanted or would have been unwanted had the mother or parents
been provided with full information.”); Motro, supra note 100, at 961 (“Most jurisdictions’
wrongful pregnancy recovery allowance covers prenatal and postnatal medical expenses,
including expenses of any complications associated with the pregnancy or birth as well
as the mother’s pain and suffering during the pregnancy and delivery.”).
220. Bridges, supra note 11, at 500.
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contexts of sex and motherhood. This section explores how these
bookend frameworks impact our culture’s ability or willingness to
identify pregnancy as a potential for harm.
1. The Conflation of Sex and Pregnancy
Although pregnancy can result from sex,221 conceptually, sex
and pregnancy are distinct acts, each involving distinct choices and
contexts. With regard to sex, one can choose to engage in it, or choose
not to; with regard to pregnancy, one can choose to use contraception
to attempt to prevent it, or choose not to do so.222 However, within our
culture and our laws, consent for sex presumes an implied consent
for pregnancy.223 This conflation of consent for sex with consent for
pregnancy means that so long as an act of sex does not fall within the
legal definition of rape, there is no collective sociolegal inclination
to consider whether a resulting pregnancy was also consensual.
However, using the example of the coercive method of birth control
sabotage, it swiftly becomes apparent how distinct consent for each
is—although a woman may have understood the contours of the sex
act(s) itself, if her birth control was sabotaged, she could not have con-
sented to the pregnancy (or potential for pregnancy) because essential
information about her reproductive options was intentionally with-
held from her.224
By conflating consent for sex with consent for pregnancy, when
sex is legally consensual225 and a pregnancy results, two dominant
cultural responses exist: the pregnancy is identified as a way to assign
blame and reach “the moral conclusion that pregnancy is an appropri-
ate punishment for women [or adolescents] who consent to engage
in sex,” 226 or the pregnancy is immediately tied to the positive con-
structions of motherhood (as discussed further infra) and is identified
221. But see MCDONAGH, supra note 157, at Ch. 3 (making a compelling argument that
fetuses, not sex, cause pregnancy).
222. Cf. Bridges, supra note 11, at 483 (“At most, by consenting to sex, [a woman] has
consented to exposing herself to the risk of becoming pregnant.”).
223. MCDONAGH, supra note 157, at 65; see, e.g., Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 847 S.W.2d
45, 47 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); Lasher v. Kleinberg, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618, 619 (1980); Faske
v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487
N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. Special Term 1985); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713,
714 (N.Y. 1983); Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 624–25 (Pa. 1983); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687
P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
224. Janet Radcliffe Richards, Consent with Inducements: The Case of Body Parts and
Services, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 281, 296 (Franklin G. Miller
& Alan Wertheimer, eds., 2010).
225. See Bridges, supra note 11, at 482.
226. MCDONAGH, supra note 157, at 65 (footnote omitted).
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as a natural, expected, and generally positive consequence of sex.
Neither construction allows for the identification of pregnancy as a
resulting harm to a woman, even when her reproductive choice was
infringed upon, or removed altogether.227
Our laws treat the sex-pregnancy dyad differently from other
parallel dyads. As Professor Khiara Bridges writes, “in many other
contexts, we do not lose the claim of having been injured or harmed
by unwanted things that happen to us—even when we have exposed
ourselves to the risk that those unwanted things will, indeed, happen
to us.” 228 For example, a person does not lose the ability to assert that
he obtained a sexually transmitted infection after the carrier withheld
information about the infection, even though one arguably always
exposes oneself to sexually transmitted infections when having sex.229
However, when it comes to deception around contraception, courts
generally provide no legal recourse, citing extreme reluctance to be-
come involved in matters of the bedroom.230 By conflating sex and
pregnancy as one act requiring one consent, women who experience
reproductive coercion are left without an ability to claim injury or
harm, regardless of her partner’s use of coercive techniques.
2. The “Homologizing” of Pregnancy and Motherhood 231
In addition to the act that precedes it, pregnancy also is conflated
with its common result: motherhood. From the moment she becomes
pregnant, a woman is tied to her prospective role as mother, identified
227. If no pregnancy results, there is a cultural response akin to “no harm, no foul.” This,
of course, fails to recognize the intense anxiety a woman can experience when wondering
if she is pregnant and weighing the costs associated with purchasing pregnancy tests or
seeking affirmation through medical testing.
228. Bridges, supra note 11, at 483–84.
229. See Hudson v. Dr. Michael J. O’Connell’s Pain Care Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 84,
95 (D.N.H. 2011) (holding that the defendant had a duty of care to the plaintiff based on
constructive knowledge because he knew that his other sexual partner’s husband had been
diagnosed with herpes); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that a man had a reasonable basis to know he had genital herpes because he had recurring
genital sores and received a medical evaluation that the sores might in fact be herpes, cre-
ating a legal duty to warn his sexual partner about his possible infection, even though
he did not have medical confirmation that the disease had been contracted); Louis A.
Alexander, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and
the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 124 (1984) (“The magnitude of the societal health
concerns associated with genital herpes precludes resort to this doctrine as a complete
defense.”); Celia M. Fitzwater, Comment, Tort Liability for Sexual Transmission of Disease:
A Legal Attempt to Cure “Bad” Behavior, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 807, 818–19 (1989).
230. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 740.
231. I borrow the word “homologizing” from Julia E. Hanigsberg as defined in her article
Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV.
371, 374 (1995).
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as a mother-in-waiting, a mother-to-be.232 Professor Julia Hanigsberg
labels this cultural phenomenon of identifying pregnancy and
motherhood as “corresponding states of being” as the “homologizing”
of pregnancy and motherhood.233 She notes that through “a legal,
political, and social process, pregnancy and motherhood are made to
resemble each other.” 234 The inextricable tie between pregnancy and
motherhood creates immediate expectations about the characteristics,
motivations, and goals of pregnant women that results in a continuum
of motherhood that begins at conception.235 Beginning motherhood
at pregnancy carries with it social assumptions about what makes
a “good” mother, leaving even expectant mothers vulnerable to high
praise or harsh judgment depending on how she responds to her
pregnancy.236 When a pregnant woman fails to express “absolute dedi-
cation” to her fetus or to establish a bond that “takes precedence over
anything else,” or if she expresses ambivalence about—or even lack
of desire for—a pregnancy, she may find herself at odds with social
expectations that hold mothers to the “highest possible, almost un-
attainable, standards.” 237 A woman who discusses the coercive circum-
stances under which her pregnancy occurred may be critiqued for not
instead focusing her energy on her pending motherhood.238 Professor
Reva Siegel writes on the impact this judgment may have on women
who bear an unwanted child:
Hypothetically, a woman compelled to bear a child she does not
want could give it up for adoption, abandon it, or pay someone else
to care for the child until maturity. In this society, however, few
women are able to abandon a child born of their body. . . . Once
compelled to bear a child against their wishes, most women will
feel obligated to raise it.239
Judgment of even expectant mothers, can be harsh and swift. For
certain categories of pregnant women—poor women, particularly
232. See id. at 374.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 371, 374.
236. Id. at 372.
237. Hanigsberg, supra note 155, at 396–97; Breger, supra note 144, at 576; see also
Jane Aiken, Requiring Selflessness: Motherhood and the Law (unpublished manuscript)
(article on file with author) (arguing that mothers “are supposed to be selfless in caring
for their children, and anything less risks heavy criticism from the rest of society.”);
Chris Gottlieb, Reflections on Judging Mothering, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 371, 373 (2010).
238. See Ikemoto, supra note 156, at 1210–11; Yxta Maya Murray, Rape Trauma, the
State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1631, 1640–41 (2012) (identifying
how women who have been raped may not talk about their experiences if they perceive
others will judge them).
239. Siegel, supra note 171, at 371–72.
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those who already have children, unmarried African American women,
and adolescent girls—this judgment may be particularly silencing.
When pregnancies are not intended, for whatever reason, poor women
and women of color are blamed more than are other groups of women
who experience unintended pregnancies.240 The welfare debates of
the 1990s elucidated this point. Rather than identifying the social and
political constructs that impacted pregnancy rates, the perception
that poor women of color were becoming pregnant (presumably
intentionally) to obtain increased state support spurred drastic wel-
fare reform.241 Poor, pregnant women of color reinforce the notion of
the “welfare queen,” as “black, heterosexual, unmarried, and sex-
ually precocious” and intent to become pregnant is assumed.242 If the
pregnant female is adolescent, she may be identified as being care-
less, irresponsible, or naive.243 The narrative of what makes a good
mother begins at pregnancy; to deviate from that narrative and share
stories of coercion and harm simply may not be worth the social price,
or may simply fall on the unsympathetic or judgmental ears.244
C. Abortion as Solution
In addition to the conflation of pregnancy and sex, and pregnancy
and motherhood, abortion also decreases the cultural and legal recog-
nition that pregnancy itself can be harmful. If a pregnancy is a harm
resulting from something other than a woman’s full and informed
choice, then, for at least part of that pregnancy, a woman could argu-
ably mitigate the harm with an abortion. Indeed, many women who
experience unintended or unwanted pregnancies choose to have one.
Because some view abortion as a solution to a coerced pregnancy, if
a woman does not terminate it, intentionality around the pregnancy
is assumed.245 As argued by Professor Shari Motro, the idea that
there is asymmetry in choice (women’s unilateral decision-making
power over abortion) counterbalances the asymmetry in sexual risk
(women’s exposure to unwanted pregnancy) and “belittles the harms
that come along with all of women’s reproductive choices.” 246 Further,
abortion is not equally available to all women. Eighty-eight percent
240. See Roberts, supra note 166 at 1420.
241. See ANNA MARIE SMITH, WELFARE REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULATION 18 (2007).
242. Id.
243. See id. at 19; Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L. J.
339, 341, 378–79 (1996).
244. See Aiken, supra note 237, at 6.
245. See MCDONAGH, supra note 157, at 28; see also Motro, supra note 100, at 918 (not-
ing that the legal response to a woman who experiences an accidental pregnancies is that
she “must deal with the consequences.”).
246. Motro, supra note 100, at 934.
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of all U.S. counties have no abortion providers.247 When considering
only non-urban counties, that number increases to 97%.248 Trans-
portation and abortion costs also restrict abortion access. Public fund-
ing for an abortion is severely restricted and abortions generally cost
hundreds of dollars to obtain, due to both the costs of the abortion
itself and the costs required for the thousands of women who must
travel to see an abortion provider.249 Even for women with greater
access to abortions, preventing an abortion may be a coercive tactic
used by an intimate partner.250 One woman described her challenges
in obtaining an abortion as follows:
He really wanted the baby—he wouldn’t let me have—he always
said ‘If I find out you have an abortion’, you know what I mean,
‘I’m gonna kill you,’ so I was forced into having my son. I didn’t
want to; I was 18. [. . . ] I was real scared; I didn’t wanna have a
baby. I just got into [college] on a full scholarship, I just found out,
I wanted to go to college and didn’t want to have a baby but I was
really scared. I was scared of him.251
Women may not universally desire abortion. Even if a woman
doesn’t want to be pregnant, she may also not want to have an abor-
tion. The premise that abortion is always available—or that a woman
will terminate an unwanted pregnancy—gives men “no external incen-
tive to prevent conception,” and may in fact give men more incentive
to assert control over a woman’s reproduction.252 Abortion may offer
a solution for some women experiencing a coerced pregnancy, but for
others, it may simply be no solution at all.
IV. CONSTRUCTING SPACE FOR PREGNANCY COERCION
To move pregnancy coercion into the broader narrative of intimate
partner abuse, women’s experiences with reproductive coercion
247. Access to Abortion, NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, http://prochoice.org/education
-and-advocacy/about-abortion/abortion-facts, archived at http://perma.cc/3UG5-KXBL
(last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
248. Id.
249. See Motro, supra note 100, at 936. Depending on the trimester for which a woman
is seeking an abortion, and whether she lives in a rural or urban community, a woman may
have to travel more than 100 miles to see an abortion provider. One-Third of U.S. Women
Seeking Abortions Travel More Than 25 Miles to Access Services, GUTTMACHER INST.
(July 26, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2013/07/26/, archived at http://perma
.cc/FG6A-JG65.
250. As stated in note 22, supra, forcing a woman to obtain an abortion can be a form
of reproductive coercion.
251. See CHAMBERLAIN & LEVENSON, supra note 22, at 12.
252. Motro, supra note 100, at 921.
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must be legitimized within our culture and our laws. This section
begins by exploring the role of our existing legal system in legitimizing
the experience of pregnancy coercion. It then explores how by shar-
ing the experiences of women, and naming the correlation between
pregnancy, coercion, and abuse, advocates can shape domestic violence
and reproductive rights policy, and begin to move pregnancy coercion
from the periphery of both.
A. Legitimacy Within Our Legal Systems
Use of the legal system to name something as harmful is a “polit-
ical act” that helps “market social problems,” and provides a founda-
tion for cultural legitimacy.253 When an act is identified as harmful
to an individual or a group—and laws are used to remedy those
harms—“public meanings and shared understandings between the
government and public” are created.254 While the law certainly is not
a panacea for all social ills, it has the power to shape, influence, and
educate the public about acceptable and unacceptable behavior.255
By linking “specific behaviors, consequences or dynamics that have
not been previously linked,” harmful behavior is moved from the
“shadow to the center of consciousness, influences how we think of
those we associate with a problem, and shapes the allocation of
resources.” 256 As argued by Professor Robin West, when our laws
fail to identify an act “uniquely sustained by a disempowered group”
as harmful, that failure denies the experience of the individuals
harmed, causing the harm to lack “a name, a history, and in general,
a linguistic reality.” 257
Within the criminal context, the stories of pregnancy coercion
remain largely unexplored. Beyond one notable exception, discussed
infra, there is neither a crime responding to reproductive coercion
nor is a defendant’s intent to coerce pregnancy particularly relevant
to a rape or assault conviction.258 Establishing that the defendant
intended to engage in the act of rape or the assault itself is sufficient.
His motivation for anything beyond proving the act was an accident
253. STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 369.
254. See Dionne L. Koller, How the Expressive Power of Title IX Dilutes Its Promise,
3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 103, 120 (2012); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory
of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000).
255. Koller, supra note 254, at 120.
256. STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 24, at 369.
257. ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND THE LAW 183–84 (1993); see Danielle
Keats Citron, Law’s Express Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 373, 407 (2009).
258. Bridges, supra note 11, at 474.
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or mistake, simply is not relevant. Civilly, when a person demon-
strates that she experienced abuse or assault, she qualifies for a
civil restraining order in every state, allowing for various forms of
relief including stay away, no-assault provisions, and no-contact
provisions.259 Abuse commonly is defined as an act that causes “seri-
ous bodily injury” or “physical injury” to another.260 Although a
259. ALA. CODE § 30-5-6(a) (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3602 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-206(a) (2013); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6300–
6306, 6320 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46b-15, 46b(e) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §1044(b) (West 2013); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.30 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(c) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-
5.5(a) (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1) (West 2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/112A-2 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-26-5-2, 34-26-5-9 (West 2014); IOWA
CODE §§ 236.2, 708.1 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3104 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 403.750(1) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134 (2014); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(1) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505(a)(1) (West 2012); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West 2007);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-7 (2013); MO. REV.
STAT. § 455.040(1) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201(2) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.018 (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(I) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(a) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3.2(A) (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-
3(a) (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-02 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(D)(1) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(B)(1) (West 2013); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.710(2) (2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(a) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 8-8.1-4(a)(2)(iii) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5
(2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(a) (2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.001(b) (West
2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2007);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.50.020 (West 2013);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(a) (2009); Machukas
v. Wagner, 246 A.D.2d 840, 667 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1989).
260. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(1) (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601(A) (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(3)(a) (2013); CAL. FAM. CODE §
6203(a) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 901(1) (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28(2) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (2012);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303 (2013); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/112A-3(1) (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-26-5-2 to -9 (2014); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 236.2(1) (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102(a)(1) (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.720(1) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(1) (2014); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(1) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(b)(1) (West 2013); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2950(1) (LexisNexis
2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(a) (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3(a)(1)
(2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.040(1) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(1)(a) (2013);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.018(1) (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(I) (2014);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3(D)(2) (2014); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 812(1) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3(a)(1) (West 2014); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-01(2) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3(a)(1) (LexisNexis
2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.705(1)(a)
(West 2014); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1 (West
2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-1 (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-601(1) (2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-7-102(1) (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2007); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-228 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West 2014); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-27-202 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102 (2014).
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coerced pregnancy—regardless of the consensual nature of the sex
itself—can result in significant harm to a woman, without more, use
of birth control sabotage to coerce a pregnancy, for example, is likely
insufficient for proving the requisite harm.261 As discussed supra,
courts are exceedingly reluctant to make factual determinations about
acts that occur within one’s sexual relationship, primarily concerning
the use or nonuse of birth control.262 The sacrosanct privacy of the bed-
room between two “consenting” adults trumps an inquiry into the
conditions in which a woman consented to contraceptive use.263
261. This Article does not assert that every method used to coerce pregnancy, on its own,
should be subject to legal relief. Acts that do not directly interfere with a woman’s physical
autonomy are distinct from the other methods described in this Article. For example, a
woman who is pressured into pregnancy through threats that a partner will leave the
relationship, or who is manipulated by assertions such as if she “really loved him,” certainly
may feel that her options are restricted. However, “pregnancy pressure” and any resulting
coercion is likely too subjective to find legitimacy within our legal system.
262. To be clear, even the criminalization of birth control sabotage would not be a pana-
cea for women experiencing such acts. In retelling stories of the ways their birth control
was sabotaged, women may be required to disclose deeply personal, and perhaps
embarrassing information about their intimate relationships and experiences. Women
may be victimized in ways similar to rape victims after being interviewed or providing
testimony about their experiences. The burden of proof in either a civil or criminal
context, in what almost always would be her story against his, would be incredibly hard
to meet. As many feminists have identified over the past forty years, the criminal justice
system often fails to provide a victim-centered remedy within the broader context of
domestic violence, isolating women from their cases, and potentially working against
their goals and safety. See GOODMARK, supra note 76, at 37.
263. The opening paragraph of Lawrence v. Texas, elucidates this point:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omni-
present in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence,
outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Free-
dom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). Prior to Lawrence, the Court incrementally and con-
sistently found that what happens within the privacy of one’s bedroom pertaining to the use
of contraception, so long as those incidents occur between two consenting adults, is sacred
and private, including the ability to use contraception whether married or unmarried.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, when considering whether the right to use contraception extended
to unmarried persons, the Court wrote, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S. at 453. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court “again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.” 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
In so doing, the Court reemphasized that “intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
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Indeed, there are no laws that directly prohibit tampering with some-
one’s birth control, or intentionally destroying one’s own and then
engaging in intercourse.264
Currently, the only method of reproductive coercion legally pro-
hibited in many states is one that coerces a woman to terminate a
pregnancy.265 While coercing abortion certainly can be a form of re-
productive control exerted by an intimate partner,266 and can be
acutely harmful to a woman who is otherwise opposed to abortion,
wants to keep the child, or suffers adverse physical consequences as
a result of the abortion,267 coerced abortion laws have not been en-
acted because of feminist advocacy or because of how such coercion
infringes upon a woman’s dignity or autonomy. Rather, such laws
have been successful because of the advocacy of those within the
anti-choice movement who seek not to protect a woman’s repro-
ductive autonomy or safety,268 but to preserve the life of the fetus.269
As noted by one researcher, the “one-sided emphasis on only penal-
izing partners and health care providers involved in coerced abor-
tions does not adequately address the danger a woman is in who is
experiencing reproductive control.” 270
To advance a domestic violence narrative that includes pregnancy
coercion, feminists and advocates should follow the experiences of
their predecessors who have identified otherwise “private” acts that
place women at direct risk of violence, dominance, and control. The
domestic violence movement broadly serves as one example of how
an issue on the periphery of social consciousness became a legally
and culturally accepted harm through such advocacy. At the begin-
ning of the movement, domestic violence was identified as a personal
264. See Trawick, supra note 16, at 747 (identifying Canada’s criminalization of “the
efforts of abusers to sabotage their victims’ reproductive wishes.”).
265. See ALA. CODE § 26-23A-5 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153 (2014); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-16-903 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 1786 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6710 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-615 (2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(9)
(2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 1599-A (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 333.17015 (West
2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-106 (2013); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-6902.02 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.90 (West 2014); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-03(3) (West 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.791 (West 2014);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-737.6 (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3208 (West
2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-53(4) (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (2014);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-312 (2014); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 253.10 (West 2014). Legislation
to criminalize coerced abortions currently is pending in Virginia and Rhode Island. See
S.277, 1st Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012); H.R. 5072, 1st Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2011).
266. Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1743.
267. Id.
268. Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L. J. 1641, 1641–42 (2008).
269. Id. at 1664.
270. Moore et al., supra note 31, at 1742.
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matter and, even in extreme cases, rarely resulted in arrest or crim-
inal liability for the perpetrator.271 It was not until anti-domestic
violence advocacy groups began bringing class action lawsuits that the
social narrative began to shift.272 Through the issuance of court
opinions and settlements, action was relatively swift. Police quickly
adopted mandatory arrest policies273 and state legislatures adopted
“no-drop” prosecution requirements in domestic violence cases.274 Al-
though these policies now are critiqued by many feminist scholars,275
when initiated, they were revolutionary and helped to shape the cul-
tural narrative of domestic violence as a social crisis that demanded
political and legal intervention.276 Similarly, once Professor Martha
Mahoney named a phenomenon that was happening to women—
violence was increasing when they separated from their intimate
partners277—separation violence became a legitimized aspect of inti-
mate partner abuse and a consideration for women’s safety.278
By identifying the correlation between pregnancy and intimate
partner abuse, feminists, advocates, and scholars can, as Professor
Mahoney has written, help “conceptualize the battering process” and
offer an alternative view of pregnancy by acknowledging the harm
it can cause.279 Advocates can tell the stories of women, both in and
out of court, who have experienced pregnancy coercion, and can
271. Citron, supra note 257, at 409. For example, in D.C., in 1990, out of approxi-
mately 15,000 domestic violence calls to MPD, only 5% of arrests occurred. Notes on file
with author.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.; cf. LISA A.GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN:
A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 71–88
(American Psychological Association, 1st ed. 2008) (arguing that no-drop prosecution
policies lack the flexibility necessary to respond effectively to particular situations).
275. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 274, at 75 (pointing out that no-drop pros-
ecution policies are inflexible, not able to respond to particular situations, and that by
coercing victims into participating in the prosecution, the government teaches them to
distrust the legal system).
276. Id. at 74.
277. Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991); see Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and
Public Problems: Applying Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence,
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 529 (2010) (citing statistics that support Mahoney’s “separation
assault” theory).
278. There is still work to be done in legitimizing separation violence. Many within the
legal system continue to assume that the best, and safest, decision for women is to separate
from their abuser, and many housing and shelter policies remain woefully underfunded.
Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 78, at 1150; Alyse Faye Haugen, When it Rains
it Pours: The Violence Against Women Act’s Failure to Provide Shelter from the Storm of
Domestic Violence, 14 SCHOLAR 1035, 1057–64 (2012) (“The most severely inadequate
provision of VAWA is undoubtedly the shelters and housing sections.”).
279. Mahoney, supra note 277, at 9.
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explicitly distinguish consent for pregnancy from consent for sex.
Lawyers and advocates can train judges, caseworkers, and police to
build a name and a narrative—establishing legitimacy—for pregnancy
coercion and violence.280 Beyond the legal system, health care pro-
viders, who often have the most direct and consistent line to pregnant
women, can inquire about women’s experiences with pregnancy and
coercion in their relationships and help them name their experience,
while providing contraceptive options that allow women more control
over their reproductive autonomy, including more discrete, and long-
term, options for birth control.281
B. Pregnancy Prevention as Violence Prevention
A woman’s experience when coerced into pregnancy, and the legal
and extra-legal response thereto, cannot fully be understood without
considering how state and federal laws and policies on reproductive
health impact her options and, therefore, her exposure to coercion
and violence. Although a detailed consideration of the state’s role in
providing options for women to avoid pregnancy or respond to coerced
pregnancies is beyond the scope of this Article, it is critical to consider
how existing laws contribute to women’s experiences.282 For example,
abstinence-only sex education, taught in more than 30% of U.S.
schools,283 deprives girls of information on their contraceptive options
or provide them with a name for behaviors their partners may use to
impose a pregnancy upon them. This limited sex education places
girls at risk of violence in their intimate relationships.
Anti-domestic violence and reproductive rights advocates can
begin to shape polices on reproductive rights by citing and sharing
the social science research that connects relationships, pregnancy,
and violence. Legislation to prevent violence against women, including
the Violence Against Women Act, can be broadened to include funding
for contraception as a tool both to prevent pregnancy and to prevent
violence in intimate relationships. Similarly, advocates can advance
comprehensive sex education policies using the strong correlation
between violence, pregnancy, and adolescent girls. Pro-choice advo-
cates can build on the success of the abortion coercion movement to
advance a pro-woman agenda on other methods of pregnancy coercion,
280. See Conversation: Lynn Harris & Elizabeth Miller on Reproductive Coercion,
supra note 9.
281. Committee Opinion Number 554, supra note 49, at 4.
282. MCDONAGH, supra note 157, at 134–38.
283. Facts on Sex Education in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST., available at
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_sexEd2006.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M6CE
-4PGS.
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arguing that coerced pregnancies can be equally as harmful as co-
erced abortions. Including reproductive autonomy as a tool for vio-
lence prevention may also allow legislators and policymakers to more
easily navigate the highly politicized landscape of contraception, sex
education, and abortion funding.
CONCLUSION
Women who experience pregnancies through coercive acts of their
intimate partners may experience significant—even extreme—harms
and are likely to experience other forms of intimate partner abuse.284
Those harms and the correlation between pregnancy and abuse,
however, are not readily named within our culture nor sufficiently
acknowledged within our laws. This Article has set out to define and
name the experience of pregnancy coercion and to provide a different
narrative of pregnancy than that which currently exists—one that
allows for its identification as not only something celebrated by a
woman, but also something that can result in significant harms to
her. With a broadened understanding of the ways that women are co-
erced into pregnancy, and the harms that can result, a more nuanced
legal and cultural understanding can be brought to the biological and
social phenomena of pregnancy.
284. Committee Opinion Number 554, supra note 49, at 1.
